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 For many years, the world has watched with horror as the 
human rights nightmare in Burma has unfolded under military rule. 
The struggle for democracy of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Daw Aung 
San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners since 1988 has captured the 
imagination of people around the world. The strength of Buddhist monks 
and their Saffron Revolution in 2007 brought Burma to the international 
community’s attention yet again.
 But a lesser known story—one just as appalling in terms of 
human rights—has been occurring in Burma over the past decade and a 
half: epidemic levels of forced labor in the 1990s, the recruitment of tens 
of thousands of child soldiers, widespread sexual violence, extrajudicial 
killings and torture, and more than a million displaced persons. One 
statistic may stand out above all others, however: the destruction, 
displacement, or damage of over 3,000 ethnic nationality villages over 
the past twelve years, many burned to the ground. This is comparable to 
the number of villages estimated to have been destroyed or damaged in 
Darfur.1 
 Yet, for too many years, the world has done little to address these 
human rights abuses. Meanwhile, the ruling military junta, including 
its leader General Than Shwe, has avoided justice and accountability. 
The scale and severity of the violations require sustained effort—for the 
abuses continue.
 We have served as Commissioners for this report prepared by 
the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School (the 
Clinic). Each of us has dealt directly with severe human rights abuses 
in the international system, and we have seen the painful consequences 
of inaction. We have seen how severe human rights abuses are not 
simply condemnable acts, but require concerted efforts to achieve some 
semblance of accountability and justice.  
1  See U.S. State Department, Humanitarian Information Unit, “Using Village De-
struction Information Responsibly, November 15, 2007,” available at http://hiu.state.
gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=public.display&id=c3462f1a-318a-445b-8ff9-78fc57de-
8a1e (indicating that as of October 2007 there had been 2,751 destroyed or damaged 
villages in the Darfur region).
 The report’s findings are both disturbing and compelling, 
especially in light of the Clinic’s exclusive reliance on official UN 
documents for its research. We have been struck by the finding that for 
years the United Nations (UN) has been on notice of severe, indeed 
widespread and systematic abuses that appear to rise to the level of state 
policy. Over and over again, UN resolutions and Special Rapporteurs 
have spoken out about the abuses that have been reported to them. The 
UN Security Council, however, has not moved the process forward 
as it should and has in similar situations such as those in the former 
Yugoslavia and Darfur. In those cases, once aware of the severity of the 
problem, the UN Security Council established a Commission of Inquiry 
to investigate the gravity of the violations further. With Burma, there 
has been no such action despite being similarly aware (as demonstrated 
in UN documents) of the widespread and systematic nature of the 
violations. 
 Based on this report’s findings and recommendations, we call on 
the UN Security Council urgently to establish a Commission of Inquiry 
to investigate and report on crimes against humanity and war crimes in 
Burma. The world cannot wait while the military regime continues its 
atrocities against the people of Burma. The day may come for a referral 
of the situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court or the 
establishment of a special tribunal to deal with Burma. Member States 
of the United Nations should be prepared to support such action. The 
people of Burma deserve no less.
Justice Richard J. Goldstone (South Africa)
Retired member of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and was the 
first prosecutor at both the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
Patricia M. Wald (United States)
Retired Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit), and former Judge 
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Sir Geoffrey Nice QC (United Kingdom)
Deputy prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and the principal prosecution trial attorney in the case against 
Slobodan Milosevic in the Hague.   
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Judge Pedro Nikken (Venezuela)
Former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and 
Member of the Executive Committee of the International Commission of 
Jurists (Geneva) 
Hon. Ganzorig Gombosuren (Mongolia) 
Former judge at the Supreme Court of Mongolia
May 2009
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Executive Summary
“These violations have been so numerous and consistent 
over the past years as to suggest that they are not simply 
isolated or the acts of individual misbehavior by middle- 
and lower-rank officers but are rather the result of 
policy at the highest level, entailing political and legal 
responsibility.”  
-  United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Rajsoomer Lallah, 19982
“As noted by the Special Rapporteur in his previous 
reports, the above-mentioned serious human rights 
violations have been widespread and systematic, 
suggesting that they are not simply isolated acts of 
individual misconduct by middle- or low-ranking 
officers, but rather the result of a system under which 
individuals and groups have been allowed to break the 
law and violate human rights without being called to 
account.” 
-  United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 20063
 Burma has been facing a grave human rights situation for years. 
Many of the organs of the United Nations have repeatedly denounced 
the ruling military regime for failing to cooperate with the international 
2  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/53/364, ¶ 59 (Sept. 10, 1998). Mr. Lallah was Special 
Rapporteur from 1996-2000.
3  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/369, ¶ 32 (Sept. 21, 2006) (hereinafter Myanmar 
Rapporteur 2006 I). Mr. Pinheiro was Special Rapporteur from 2000-2008.
community and to take serious steps to end the ongoing grave violations 
of international law.  
 In light of the seriousness of allegations concerning the 
destruction or displacement of more than 3,000 villages (more than 
the number relocated in Darfur), this report set out to review UN 
documentation of reports of human rights and humanitarian law 
violations in Burma. Specifically, the report sought to evaluate the 
extent to which UN institutions have knowledge of reported abuses 
occurring in the country that may constitute war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in the country. The report finds that UN bodies have 
indeed consistently acknowledged abuses and used legal terms associated 
with these international crimes, including for example that violations 
have been widespread, systematic, or part of a state policy. This finding 
necessitates more concerted UN action. In particular, despite the 
recognition of the existence of these violations by many UN organs, to 
date, the Security Council has failed to act to ensure accountability and 
justice. In light of more than fifteen years of condemnation from UN 
bodies for human rights abuses in Burma, the Security Council should 
institute a Commission of Inquiry to investigate grave crimes that have 
been committed in the country.
 This report evaluates Burma’s breaches in light of the Rome 
Statute, which provides one of the available sets of international criminal 
standards. Part I of the report provides a brief history of Burma. Part 
II summarizes the applicable international criminal law under the 
Rome Statute. Part III traces the discussion in UN documents of grave 
human rights and humanitarian violations identified as occurring in 
eastern Burma since 2002. In this geographic sampling, the report 
details forced displacement, sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, and 
torture, especially against ethnic nationalities though the UN documents 
chronicle many other severe violations as well. The recent temporal 
focus was chosen because it is most relevant to the Rome Statute. Part 
IV identifies precedents for further UN action from its response to other 
humanitarian crises in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur. Part 
V presents the report’s conclusions.
Findings
 In light of the repeated and consistent reports of widespread 
human rights violations in Burma outlined in UN documents, there 
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is a prima facie case of international criminal law violations occurring 
that demands UN Security Council action to establish a Commission of 
Inquiry to investigate these grave breaches further.  
•	 Multiple organs of the UN system have documented and/or 
condemned serious human rights abuses committed under 
the military regime, including the General Assembly, the 
Commission on Human Rights, the Human Rights Council, 
four consecutive Special Rapporteurs on the Situation of Human 
Rights in Myanmar, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW Committee).
•	 In exposing the extent of violations such as forced displacement, 
the UN has recognized the existence of systematic and 
widespread human rights abuses. The recognition that many 
violations occurred in the context of armed conflict strongly 
suggests that these violations may amount to war crimes, as well 
as crimes against humanity in contravention of international 
criminal law. The four violations studied in detail in this report—
forced displacement, rape (and sexual violence), extrajudicial 
killings, and torture—may all implicate international criminal 
law violations.
•	 The study of violations in eastern Burma highlights that ethnic 
nationalities are particularly vulnerable to the systematic abuses 
most often reportedly perpetrated by the Burmese military 
forces. 
•	 The UN has emphasized the culture of impunity and 
inoperability of the Burmese judiciary that benefits the 
perpetrators of the widespread and systematic violations, thus 
legitimatizing the intervention of the international community to 
seek redress. 
•	 There is precedent for the creation of a Commission of Inquiry. 
The response of the UN Security Council to the humanitarian 
situations in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur 
followed the same pattern. The UN Security Council determined 
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that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and 
security and then created such a Commission, whose mandate 
included investigating and documenting ongoing violations and 
making recommendations for future action.
•	 The international community has failed to place sufficient 
pressure on the Security Council to create a Commission of 
Inquiry. The Council is the only body that can take the action 
necessary to respond adequately to the crisis in Burma.
Recommendations
 In light of the prima facie case of the existence in Burma of grave 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including 
contravention of the prohibitions against crimes against humanity and 
war crimes, the Security Council should: 
•	 Declare that the situation in Burma constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security and initiate a formal 
investigation through a Commission of Inquiry to investigate 
crimes committed in Burma. Such a Commission should apply 
all relevant international criminal law standards to the evidence 
it gathers. While the focus of this report is eastern Burma, the 
Commission should investigate abuses throughout the country. 
Similarly, while this report focuses on four particularly severe 
violations, UN organs have condemned many others that are 
expressly forbidden by the Rome Statute and international 
criminal law.
•	 The international community, particularly the member countries 
of the United Nations, should make it clear to the Security 
Council that such action is needed. 
•	 Further, the Security Council should be prepared to act upon 
findings and recommendations made by such a Commission, 
including a potential referral to the International Criminal Court, 
the permanent body established to investigate, try, and sentence 
those who commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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Methodology
 A wide-range of human rights abuses and humanitarian law 
violations have been occurring in Burma for decades. Some abuses, 
such as widespread forced labor and the detention of political prisoners, 
including Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Daw Aung Saw Suu Kyi, have 
received significant attention. This report sought to determine the extent 
of UN knowledge of widely reported human rights abuses in Burma in 
light of principles of international criminal law. The report analyzes the 
terminology describing the violations employed by the UN itself. Terms 
used by UN actors, such as “widespread”, “systematic”, “policy”, and 
“impunity”, are relevant to the establishment of international crimes. 
 This report is the outcome of an intensive review of UN 
documents. It does not rely on NGO reports or accounts for its findings. 
The primary source materials are all UN documents, including, for 
example, UN General Assembly and Human Rights Commission 
resolutions, and the reports of a number of different Special Rapporteurs. 
To provide a deeper and more thorough analysis of the information 
included in UN documents, the report also adopted a particular subject 
matter, geographical, and temporal focus.
Subject Matter
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides 
a measurement tool for evaluating international criminal law violations. 
The Rome Statute is a recent and important source of most of the major 
principles in this area of law, including prohibitions on both war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.4 It also includes an articulation of the more 
4  Such crimes are also violations of customary international law, which would pro-
vide an alternative basis for evaluation. Given the temporal and geographic foci of 
the report (that is post-2002), however, the Rome Statute was chosen to be the mea-
surement tool. Customary international law would be relevant for pre- and post-2002 
events. While there may be differences between the Rome Statute and customary 
international law, discussion of such distinctions is beyond the scope of this report. 
This report provides only a brief overview of international criminal law, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity in Part II. It specifically outlines the key elements of 
these crimes that are relevant to establishing a prima facie case for further investiga-
tion. At this level, customary international law and the Rome Statute are in agree-
particularized crimes examined in this report: forced displacement, 
sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, and torture. These selected 
violations are both well-established and representative of the egregious 
nature of reported abuses in Burma.
Temporal Focus
 Though UN documents have included a range of human rights 
and humanitarian law violations since 1992, the report’s temporal focus 
centers on events since 2002. Thus, this report examines a period of time 
after the UN had already acknowledged the existence of abuses for more 
than a decade. The more recent time-frame also allows for the use of the 
most up-to-date UN material. Finally, the Rome Statute is the evaluative 
tool of the report, and its temporal jurisdiction is limited to crimes 
committed after July 1, 2002.
Geographical Focus
 The geographical focus of the report is eastern Burma. This 
focus was chosen because it provides a representative sample of 
violations experienced by the different ethnic nationalities in the country. 
Additionally, Eastern Burma is an area that has experienced significant 
human rights violations for many years, which indicates the existence of 
a pattern of abuses. In addition, since 2002, there have been new, major 
operations by the Burmese army in the area against civilians, which 
provides an important sample of data for assessing whether international 
crimes may have been committed within the report’s temporal focus.
ment.
6  Methodology
I.  History of Burma
 Modern Burmese history has been marked by decades of military 
rule, widespread human rights violations, and armed conflict. Since 
1962, the Burmese military has repressed political opposition—whether 
in the country’s urban areas where political parties are most active or 
rural areas where ethnic nationality groups predominate. Human rights 
abuses by the military regime in both conflict and non-conflict zones 
have been commonplace, with attacks primarily aimed at students, 
political opponents, and ethnic nationalities. The rights abuses range 
from the suppression of civil and political rights, such as freedom of 
expression and assembly, to arbitrary detentions and problems associated 
with the lack of an independent judiciary. Violent abuses, such as 
extrajudicial killings, torture, and disappearances, along with epidemic 
levels of forced labor and discriminatory practices against women and 
ethnic nationalities have also been historically widespread. The UN has 
consistently acknowledged wide-ranging human rights violations since 
the early 1990s, highlighting the long-term pattern of abuses that have 
characterized Burma’s history.
A. Early History and Independence in 1948
 Prior to the nineteenth century, Burma5 existed as a collection 
of territories ruled by different ethnic groups,6 The Burman people are 
the largest ethnic group inhabiting the central areas of the modern state, 
with other major ethnic nationality and minority groups such as the 
Arakanese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, and Shan, occupying 
5  Burma’s military regime changed the name of the country to “Myanmar” in Jul. 
1989. See Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces, Power Without Glory xxxiii 
(2002). Burma’s democracy movement continues to use the term “Burma”. See 
Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule 5 (2001). Coun-
tries throughout the world generally use one or the other. The European Union, for 
example, uses the terminology of “Burma/Myanmar”. See, e.g., European Council 
Common Position 2008/349/CFSP of 29 Apr. 2008 renewing restrictive measures 
against Burma/Myanmar, L 116/57.
6  For a fuller explanation, see Selth, supra note 5, at 7; and Josef Silverstein, Burma, 
Military Rule And The Politics Of Stagnation 3-5 (1977) (hereinafter Silver-
stein I).
border areas.7 Historically, the relationship between central rule and the 
ethnic areas has varied significantly. Many ethnic nationalities have had 
kingdoms and principalities of their own at times, as well as different 
languages, culture, and political identities.8
 In 1824, the British initiated a military campaign to gain control 
over Burma, which was ruled by the Konbaung Dynasty at the time.9 
Through a series of three wars, the British colonized the country in 
1885.10 The British first annexed Burma to British India, but made Burma 
a separate crown colony in 1937.11 In ruling Burma’s diverse population, 
the British were accused of favoring certain ethnic groups over others.12
 During World War II, Japan took control of Burma with the help 
of the Japanese-trained Burma Independence Army, which was led by the 
country’s independence hero General Aung San.13 However, as the war 
went on many leaders of this group remained focused on establishing 
an independent state.14 They created the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom 
League (AFPFL), and began to resist the Japanese with the help of the 
British.15 The British and the AFPFL under General Aung San eventually 
liberated Burma from Japan in 1945.16
 After the war, Burmese nationalists demanded independence 
for Burma from Britain.17 The British initially resisted but then agreed 
after major demonstrations ensued and General Aung San sought the 
cooperation of Burma’s ethnic nationalities in forming a federal union of 
Burma.18 As a result, in early 1947 Aung San and many of Burma’s ethnic 
nationality groups (though not all) established the Panglong Agreement. 
The agreement included a “principle of equality” between Burmans 
7  For a fuller explanation, see Martin Smith, Burma, The Politics Of Ethnicity 
29-30 (1991).
8  Silverstein I, supra note 6, at 4-6.
9  Silverstein I, supra note 6, at 5-6.
10  Id.
11  Id. at viii; see also BBC News, Timeline: Burma, A Chronology of Key Events, Jul. 30, 
2008, available http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1300082.stm
12  Smith, supra note 7, at 44.
13  Fink, supra note 5, at 21.
14  Id.
15  Id.
16  Timeline, supra note 11.
17  Fink, supra note 5, at 21.
18  Id. at 21-22.
8  History of Burma
and ethnic nationalities and laid the groundwork for a federal union 
with political autonomy for ethnic nationality areas.19 On July 19, 1947, 
General Aung San and several other key leaders of Burma’s independence 
movement were assassinated.20 Despite the loss of many of its most 
respected and unifying figures, the course of the country’s independence 
and the establishment of democracy continued.21 A new constitution 
came into effect on September 2, 1947, and full independence was 
realized in 1948 with the creation of a parliamentary democracy.22 States 
were considered autonomous, and certain ethnic nationalities had the 
constitutional right to secede from the union after ten years.23 However, 
the trust that some ethnic nationality groups had placed in General 
Aung San, the architect of the Panglong Agreement, eroded under his 
successors.24
B. Military Rule: 1962-1988
 Despite a wealth of natural resources and the existence 
of a well-educated ruling class, Burmese democracy faced several 
challenges. First, disagreements and debate amongst the urban elite were 
common. Second, political tensions between Rangoon and some ethnic 
nationalities continued. Finally, Cold War politics also exacerbated 
the situation as the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) began fighting 
against the Government of Burma in 1948.25 Many ethnic nationalities, 
fearing a loss of autonomy under the new government began to look 
for other political solutions. For example, Shan leaders and peoples 
debated whether to seek the right to gain independence granted to them 
in the constitution.26 Some also formed their own armies, which either 
19  Josef Silverstein, Burmese Politics And The Dilemma Of National Unity, 
108 (1980) (hereinafter Silverstein II).
20  Silverstein I, supra note 6, at 20.
21  Silverstein II, supra note 19, at 126.
22  The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation 
of human rights in Myanmar, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission 
on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1994/57 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
23  Id.
24  Silverstein II, supra note 19, at 155.
25  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22.
26  Fink, supra note 5, at 27.
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collaborated with the CPB or separately pursued the struggle for ethnic 
autonomy.27 By 1960, numerous groups were in armed conflict with the 
Tatmadaw—the Burmese Army.28 
 During the 1950s, military leaders began criticizing 
parliamentary rule and the constraints it placed on their powers.29 
They were concerned about “civilian influence” in their affairs, and 
the “disorderliness” of the parliamentary system.30 In 1962, General 
Ne Win staged a coup that began the era of military rule, which still 
continues.31 Ne Win dominated the country’s politics as a dictator until 
the late 1980s.32 He created the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” a program 
that formed a single-party system controlled by his Burmese Socialist 
Program Party (BSPP).33 Ne Win also isolated the country by remaining 
neutral during the Cold War and leaving the non-aligned movement in 
1979 in protest against Soviet “machinations”.34
 Starting in the 1960s, Ne Win’s regime also instituted the Four 
Cuts policy, aimed at cutting off armed ethnic nationalities groups from 
food, money, intelligence, and recruits.35 The Four Cuts policy led to 
thousands of civilian deaths36 and the destruction of food, crops, and 
numerous villages.37 In the face of international criticism, the Burmese 
regime began in the late 1980s to deny the existence of the Four Cuts 
policy;38 however, evidence suggests that it remains a policy and practice 
even today.39 
 Ne Win’s regime also suppressed political opposition in 
urban areas, including student-led uprisings in 1974.40 In 1974, a new 
27  Id. at 29; Smith, supra note 7, at 134-136 (section “The First United Fronts”).
28  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22, at ¶ 4.
29  Fink, supra note 5, at 27.
30  Id.
31  Id. at 29.
32  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22, at ¶ 8.
33  Id. at ¶ 5.
34  Smith, supra note 7, at 201.
35  Fink, supra note 5, at 48.
36  Smith, supra note 7, at 220.
37  Id. at 259.
38  Id.
39  For a history of the Four Cuts Policy, see id. at 258-72.  For evidence of its ongoing 
practice, see infra Part III.
40  Bertil Lintner, Burma In Revolt, Opium And Insurgency Since 1948, 232 (1994) 
(hereinafter Lintner I).
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constitution officially transferred power to a People’s Assembly but 
in reality Ne Win retained firm control.41 Regionally-based ethnic 
nationality groups also continued to struggle against the Tatmadaw 
and Ne Win’s rule. A coalition of nine such groups, including the Karen 
National Union (KNU), the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), 
and the New Mon State Party (NMSP), formed the National Democratic 
Front (NDF) that grappled with issues of territory, federalism, and the 
right of secession.42 Coalition members of the NDF as well as the CPB 
and others groups held significant territory in Burma and fought against 
the Tatmadaw.43
 Burma has vast natural resources—timber, gems, and agricultural 
lands—but poor economic management also characterized Ne Win’s 
rule.44 For example, in the 1950s, Burma was exporting three million tons 
of rice per year, but by 1988 rice exports had fallen to nearly zero.45 Under 
the military rule such natural advantages were not developed, and the 
country’s economy stagnated and regressed.46 
C. The 1988 Popular Uprising and Democratic     
Elections of 1990
 By 1987, years of economic mismanagement had caused severe 
currency devaluation, and Burma’s economy had collapsed, wiping out 
many peoples’ savings.47 In response to the economic situation as well as 
the suppression of civil and political rights since 1962,48 large student-led 
demonstrations emerged, culminating in major peaceful protests calling 
for democracy in August 1988.49 Hundreds of thousands marched in the 
streets.50 The regime responded violently, with the army killing thousands 
41  Fink, supra note 5, at 35-36.
42  Smith, supra note 7, at 294.
43  Id. at 272.
44  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22, at ¶ 6.
45  Smith, supra note 7, at 120.
46  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22, at ¶ 6.
47  Bertil Lintner, Outrage: Burma’s Struggle For Democracy, 192 (1990) (here-
inafter Lintner II).
48  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22, at ¶ 4.
49  Id. at ¶ 8.
50  Lintner I, supra note 40, at xi.
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of civilians, including women and children.51 
 Conservative estimates indicate that at least 3,000 people were 
killed in August 1988 alone.52 In response, the military leadership re-
organized itself and took power as the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council (SLORC).53 The new regime declared martial law and arrested 
demonstrators.54 
 Despite the crackdown in 1988 calls for democracy continued, 
and in May 1990, the regime held multi-party elections.55 Though many 
opposition leaders had been placed under house arrest or imprisoned 
at the time, the military suffered a massive defeat in the elections.56 By 
this time Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of General Aung San, had 
emerged as the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), the 
major opposition group. Her party won over 80% of the parliamentary 
seats in the 1990 elections.57 However, the ruling SLORC refused to 
transfer power.58 Instead, the SLORC created a military-led National 
Convention to draft a new constitution59 and increasingly suppressed 
pro-democracy advocates, including elected members of parliament.60 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, for example, has been under house arrest for 
much of the past two decades,61 and the military regime has arrested 
many politically active individuals during its rule.62
D. Military Rule Since 1988
 The characteristics of the Ne Win period—political oppression, 
51  Id.
52  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22, at ¶ 8.
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at ¶ 9
56  Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.
57  Id. at ¶ 9.
58  Id.
59  Council on Foreign Relations, Burma, Time For Change, 8 (2003) (hereinafter 
Time for Change).
60  Id.
61  The Elders, “Aung San Suu Kyi”, at http://www.theelders.org/elders/elders.
aspx?elder=kyi&more=page1.
62  See, e.g., Amnesty International, “Myanmar, Imprisonment of Students” 
(ASA 16/009/1997), available at http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/
ENGASA160091997?open&of=ENG-MMR.
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lack of movement towards democracy, and violations of human rights—
continued into the 1990s and 2000s. The military, retained tight control, 
with General Than Shwe leading the junta starting in 1992.63 In 1997, 
the regime changed its name to State Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC), and Burma was admitted into the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nationals (ASEAN),64 but human rights abuses continued.
 With the end of the Cold War and the awarding of the Nobel 
Prize to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991,65 however, the regime’s record 
began to receive more scrutiny internationally.66 In 1991, the UN General 
Assembly passed its first resolution on Burma,67 and in 1992, the UN 
Commission on Human Rights similarly expressed concerns about the 
“seriousness of the human rights situation”,68 including restrictions placed 
on political leaders69 and the exodus of Muslim refugees to Bangladesh.70 
In 1993, the first Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar reported on investigations made with regards to the country.71 
The report documented, among other violations, “[d]etentions without 
minimum guarantees for persons under custody, torture, cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment, disappearances and arbitrary execution have 
been carried out by the Myanmar authorities.”72 Subsequent yearly 
63  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22, at ¶ 11. In 1992, General Than Shwe replaced 
General Saw Maung as SLORC Chairman, Prime Minister, and Defense Minister. 
See, e.g., Michael Leifer, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of South-East 
Asia 270-271 (3rd ed.) (2001).
64  Time For Change, supra note 59, at 9-10.
65  Aung San Suu Kyi Biography, Nobel Peace Prize Foundation, at http://nobelprize.
org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1991/index.html.
66  See, e.g.,The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situ-
ation of human rights in Myanmar, Report on the situation of human rights in Myan-
mar, in accordance with Commission resolution 1992/58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/37 
(Feb. 17, 1993).
67  Situation in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 46/132, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/132 (Dec. 17, 1991) 
(“Noting with concern substantive available information indicating a grave human 
rights situation in Myanmar”). 
68  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1992/58, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1992/58, ¶ 2 (Mar. 3, 1992).
69  Id.
70  Id. at preamble and ¶ 9.
71  Special Rapporteur, supra note 66.
72  Id. at ¶ 228. 
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reports have continued to detail such violations.73 
 In the aftermath of the 1988 uprising and failed elections, many 
Burmese students fled to Burma’s jungles, some joining the armed 
struggle against the Tatmadaw.74 Armed conflict continued throughout 
the 1990s as the Burmese army mounted attacks to gain control of 
border regions.75 The military regime’s offensives weakened the ethnic 
movements,76 and many groups signed ceasefire agreements with the 
military regime during the early and mid-1990s.77
 During the 1990s, the numerous military campaigns against 
ethnic nationality groups led to a litany of human rights violations, which 
included increased displacement—both inside the country and into 
neighboring countries. In early 1992, for example, a mass exodus took 
place, during which at least 250,000 Muslims from Burma (the Rohingya) 
fled to Bangladesh.78 In 1995, after heavy shelling, the regime seized the 
KNU headquarters at Manerplaw, and thousands of refugees fled into 
the jungles and into neighboring Thailand.79 In the mid- to late 1990s, 
the regime also launched major attacks against the Shan as well as other 
ethnic nationalities, which forced hundreds of villages to relocate and 
hundreds of thousands to flee their homes, including many to Thailand.80 
The Special Rapporteur reported that regime soldiers were committing 
numerous, severe human rights abuses against ethnic nationality 
civilians.81 By the late 1990s, more than 100,000 refugees were in camps 
73  See Chart C, Human Rights Violations Listed by Reports of the Special Rapporteur 
on the situation of human rights in Myanmar.
74  Fink, supra note 5, at 62.
75  Thailand Burma Border Consortium, “Programme Report, Jul. to December 2008”, 
Appendix F, at 150-51 (hereinafter Programme Report.)
76  Id.
77  Taylor & Francis Group, Europa World Year Book 2, 3014 (45th ed.) (2004).
78  Special Rapporteur, supra note 22, at ¶ 10.
79  Burmese Expand Offensive, Associated Press, Jan. 30, 1995.
80  The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation 
of human rights in Myanmar, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Com-
mission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. 
A/53/364, ¶¶ 52, 54 (Sept. 10, 1998). 
81  See, e.g., The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the 
situation of human rights in Myanmar, Report on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar, submitted  in accordance with Commission resolution 1994/85, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1995/65, ¶ 102, (Jan. 12, 1995).
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in Thailand,82 in addition to the many internally displaced persons within 
Burma itself.83
 Forced labor was also occurring in epidemic proportions during 
the 1990s. The International Labour Organization (ILO), a UN agency, 
formed a Commission on Inquiry in 1997 that found in its 1998 report 
that there was a prolific use of forced labor in the country:
There is abundant evidence before the Commission 
showing the pervasive use of forced labour imposed 
on the civilian population throughout Myanmar by 
the authorities and the military for portering, the 
construction, maintenance and servicing of military 
camps, other work in support of the military, work 
on agriculture, logging and other production projects 
undertaken by the authorities or the military, sometimes 
for the profit of private individuals, the construction 
and maintenance of roads, railways and bridges, other 
infrastructure work and a range of other tasks, none of 
which comes under any of the exceptions listed in Article 
2(2) of the Convention.84 
 The Commission of Inquiry stated that its findings “reveal[ed] a 
saga of untold misery and suffering, oppression and exploitation of large 
sections of the population inhabiting Myanmar by the Government, 
military and other public officers.”85 Yet, the use of forced labor has 
continued to be “widespread”, especially by the army,86 and the ILO has 
82  Programme Report, supra note 75 , at 150-51.
83  Id.
84  Governing Body, International Labour Organization, Forced Labor in Myanmar 
(Burma): Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Con-
stitution of the International Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myan-
mar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), 2 Jul., 1998, Part V, Conclusions 
and Recommendations, 14 (3) Conclusions On the Substance of the Case, ¶ 528, 
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myan-
mar5.htm#14.%20Conclusions%20and%20recommendations (citations omitted).
85  Id. at 14 (5) Concluding observations, ¶ 543.
86  International Labour Office, Governing Body, Developments concerning the ques-
tion of the observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Conven-
tion, 1930 (No. 29), Legal aspects arising out of the 95th Session of the International 
Labour Conference, GB.297/8/2, ¶ 23 (Nov. 2006), at  http://www.ilo.int/public/
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noted that the systematic nature of the use of forced labor may constitute 
a crime against humanity.87 In 2009, the ILO stated that the “overall 
forced labor situation remains serious in the country,” despite ongoing 
efforts to pressure the regime to end the practice.88 
 By the late 1990s, the SPDC had largely consolidated control over 
the country; however, political freedoms did not follow. The SPDC has 
continuously placed restrictions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other 
politicians.89 Hundreds of political prisoners have been held for years.90 
As with the events of 1988, brief periods where more political space has 
existed have been followed by clampdowns. A student uprising in 1996 
led to a new round of arrests and imprisonments, for example.91 As it has 
persecuted students, including closing the universities for much of the 
1990s, the military has also targeted political parties. For example, in May 
2003, during a time when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had been released from 
house arrest and was attempting to organize NLD activities by traveling 
outside Rangoon, regime supporters attacked her supporters, resulting 
english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb297/pdf/gb-8-2.pdf noting the “widespread” use 
of forced labor, “particularly by the army,” and that the ILO’s findings would be “rel-
evant points of departure” for any investigation by the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court).
87  Id. at ¶ 24 (“The pattern established over time, including by the Commission of 
Inquiry, suggests a systematic course of conduct in the nature of a crime against hu-
manity, since such acts have been committed multiple times, by military authorities 
or under military control, against the civilian population of Myanmar. The continu-
ing lack of adequate compliance by Myanmar with certain of the recommendations 
of the Commission of Inquiry, together with the prosecution of individuals for lodg-
ing allegedly false complaints of forced labour, may point to a state policy to commit, 
and permit the commission of, such acts.”) (citations omitted).
88  International Labour Office, Governing Body, Developments concerning the ques-
tion of the observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Conven-
tion, 1930 (No. 29), GB.304/5/1 (Rev.) (Mar. 2009), at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_103631.
pdf.
89  Amnesty International, Myanmar: Twenty Years On, More Than 2,000 Politi-
cal Prisoners (Aug. 3, 2008), available at http://www.amnesty.org.au/news/com-
ments/15973/.
90  Id.
91  The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation 
of human rights in Myanmar, Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1996/80, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1997/64, ¶¶ 53-54 (Feb. 6, 1997).
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in injuries and deaths.92 The event has become known as the Depayin 
Massacre.93
 As evidenced by the events of August and September 2007, 
the military persecutes not only students and politicians but other 
actors including religious institutions. For example, the military regime 
targeted Buddhist monks during the 2007 events,94 which have become 
known as the Saffron Revolution (a reference to the color of the monks’ 
robes).95 The military regime’s sudden removal of fuel subsidies in August 
2007 triggered peaceful demonstrations, which led to the detention 
of several 1988 generation student activists, and the beating of several 
monks.96 Throughout September 2007, demonstrations grew under 
the leadership of Buddhist monks and spread across the country.97 The 
regime responded with a harsh crackdown, using the tools of violence, 
arbitrary detention, a curfew and the banning of public gatherings.98 
The UN Special Rapporteur reported fatalities and numerous arrests.99 
The UN Security Council responded by issuing its first ever-Presidential 
Statement on Burma that deplored the violence used against protestors, 
urged the release of all political prisoners, and called for the military 
regime to “create the necessary conditions for a genuine dialogue . . . with 
all concerned parties and ethnic groups.”100
92  Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of hu-
man rights in Myanmar, Report on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2004/33, ¶¶ 12-21 (Jan. 5, 2004).
93  Asian Legal Resource Center Press Release, “Statement on ‘Myanmar: Massacre at 
Depayin’ received by Commission on Human Rights”, available at http://www.alrc.
net/pr/pdf/pl-alrc-20-2004.pdf.
94  See, e.g, Andrew Bancombe and Peter Popham, “Burma: Inside the Saffron Revolu-
tion”, The Independent World (Sept. 27, 2007), at http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/asia/burma-inside-the-saffron-revolution-403645.html.
95  See, e.g., U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Burma’s Saffron Revolu-
tion” (Oct. 3, 2007), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2007/hrg071003p.
html.
96  See The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar , Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, mandated by 
resolution S-51 adopted by the Human Rights Council at its fifth Special Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/6/14, ¶¶ 16-18 (Dec. 7, 2007). 
97  Id. at ¶¶ 20, 26.
98  Id. at ¶¶ 30-62. 
99  Id. at ¶¶ 30-38, 41-52, 55. 
100  UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
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 The military regime ignored the UN Security Council, as it has 
other calls from the UN to protect civil and political freedoms. Instead, 
it has pursued its own course. In May 2008, one week after Cyclone 
Nargis hit Burma and left an estimated 134,000 dead,101 the SPDC held 
a referendum on a new constitution, which would institutionalize its 
power after elections.102 The international community, including UN 
actors, have condemned the new constitution and its drafting process 
for lacking real participation (as well as legitimacy and reconciliation).103 
For example, one of the reasons the Constitution is condemned is that 
those who criticize the process may be sentenced and imprisoned.104 The 
continuation of political suppression is also evidenced by the fact that 
between June 2007 and late November 2008, the military nearly doubled 
the number of political prisoners in the country to over 2,100.105
Conclusion
 Burma has lived under autocratic and repressive military rule 
for more than four decades. The situation in Burma constitutes one of 
the world’s worst human rights situations. The UN General Assembly 
and Human Rights Commission (now Human Rights Council) have 
passed repeated resolutions condemning Burma’s military regime for 
human rights abuses every year since 1990 and 1992, respectively. UN 
Special Envoys and UN Special Rapporteurs have traveled to Burma 
over 40 times to discuss democratization and human rights, yet, they 
have achieved few sustainable goals. After years of resolutions at the 
General Assembly and Human Rights Commission had failed to produce 
any progress, the UN Security Council placed Burma on its permanent 
S/PRST/2007/37 (Oct. 11, 2007). 
101  IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, a project of the UN Office for the Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Myanmar: Concerns over premature returns,” 
(Apr. 16, 2009), at http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=78529.
102  Yash Ghai, The 2008 Myanmar Constitution: Analysis and Assessment; The Spe-
cial Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, on the implementation of 
Council resolutions S-5/1 and 6/33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/12, ¶¶ 9-29 (Jun. 3, 2008). .
103  See, e.g., id. at ¶ 18.
104  Id. at ¶ 22.
105  Amnesty International Canada, “Human Rights in Myanmar: Overview,” at 
http://www.amnesty.ca/themes/myanmar_overview.php.
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agenda in 2006. The long-standing pattern of abuses in Burma provides 
the background for analyzing the violations in the country since 2002 
focused on in this report. 
Crimes in Burma  19
20  History of Burma
II.  International Criminal 
Law Framework
 International law outlaws both crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, which are the focus of this report. This section outlines a very 
brief overview of these crimes and the key criteria for establishing their 
existence under the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which was adopted in July 1998 and came into force 
in July 2002, is a useful articulation of many of modern principles of 
international criminal law.106 While Burma is also obligated to comply 
with customary and other treaty obligations that extend beyond the 
Rome Statute,107 it provides the legal framework that this report uses to 
analyze the ongoing violations in eastern Burma. 
106  While the Rome Statute does not reflect all aspects of customary international 
law principles embodied in international criminal law, its recent adoption and wide 
ratification makes it a useful evaluative tool for this report. The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 Jul. 1998, UN Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (hereinafter Rome Statute).
107  Burma is subject to certain international humanitarian obligations relating to 
armed conflict. For example, since August 1992, Burma has been a party to the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which are also considered largely to constitute 
customary international law. See Dieter Fleck, The Handbook of International 
Humanitarian law 28 (2nd ed) (2008). Thus, as a matter of customary international 
and treaty law, Burma’s obligation is to carry out its military operations during armed 
conflict according to the minimum standards established in common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
(hereinafter First Geneva Convention); Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, (hereinafter Second Geneva Convention); Con-
vention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 (hereinafter Third Geneva Convention); Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949. 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
(hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention). If Burma’s leaders violate these minimum 
requirements, they may have committed war crimes. For customary norms, whether 
Burma has signed a specific treaty or not that includes such prohibitions, it is bound 
not to commit such violations. In such cases where an individual commits a crime 
against humanity, for example, another state would have the ability to prosecute that 
person based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.
 After years of negotiations,108 the Rome Statute established the 
first permanent international tribunal in charge of prosecuting war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of aggression.109 
There are a number of specific means through which the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) can obtain jurisdiction over a particular 
situation:110
•	 The State where the conduct in question occurred is a State Party 
to the Statute;111 
•	 The accused is a national of a State Party to the Statute;112
•	 A State accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC with respect to the 
crime in question;113 or
•	 The UN Security Council, under its Chapter VII powers, refers 
the situation to the ICC.114 
 With regards to Burma, the UN referral is the most relevant 
108  The ICC is the culmination of decades of legal developments, including the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, which followed World War II and the Ad 
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 
1990s. For a fuller discussion of the history of the creation of the ICC, see, e.g., Rob-
ert Cryer, Hakan Friman, Darryl Robinson and Elisabeth Wilmhurst, An Introduc-
tion to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Part C (2007).
109  The crime of aggression is also formally within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but 
it is unable to exercise its jurisdiction unless and until the State Parties have agreed 
to both a definition and the conditions upon which there will be an exercise of such 
jurisdiction. Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 5(2).
110  There are two additional elements governing jurisdiction under the Rome Statute. 
First, the ICC’s personal jurisdiction is limited to persons over the age of eighteen 
at the time the alleged offence was committed. Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(hereinafter RPE), 9 Sept. 2002, rule 44(2), ICC-ASP/1/3. Second, there is a temporal 
jurisdictional requirement that prevents the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over of-
fences committed before the entry into force of the ICC Statute on Jul. 1, 2002. Rome 
Statute, supra note 106, at art. 11(1).
111  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 12(a). Jurisdiction also arises in situations 
where the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft where the State of regis-
tration of that vessel or aircraft is a Party to the Statute. Id.
112  Id. at art. 12(b).
113  Id. at art. 12(3).
114  Id. at art. 13(b). In the event of a referral by the Security Council the Court has 
jurisdiction even if none of the relevant States is a party to the Statute or gives its 
consent.
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potential ground for jurisdiction because Burma is not a party to the 
Statute. However, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction unless there is a 
failure on the part of a national judicial system to act.115 Thus, the ICC 
supplements and does not supplant national jurisdictions, a concept 
known as the principle of complementarity that is enshrined in Article 17 
of the Rome Statute.116 The ICC will be unable to exercise its jurisdiction 
if a national authority is investigating or prosecuting the case.117 
However, the ICC can gain jurisdiction if a State is unwilling118 or unable 
genuinely119 to carry out the investigation or prosecution.120 A case must 
be sufficiently grave to justify the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction.121  
 To establish the existence of a crime against humanity or war 
crime, there are several aspects to the legal analysis. First, there must be 
a “prohibited” (or “enumerated”) act. Second, such a prohibited act must 
take place within a particular context, which is defined by the “chapeau” 
or common elements of a crime against humanity or war crime. For 
example, torture is a prohibited act, but not all acts of torture constitute 
a crime against humanity or war crime. If, however, torture takes places 
115  Cryer, et al., supra note 108, at 127.
116  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 17; see also Cryer, et al., supra note 100, at 
127.
117  See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 17(1)(c). An ICC case may not pro-
ceed if the person has already been tried for the relevant conduct.
118  Id. at art. 17(2) (providing that a determination that a state is unwilling to carry 
out proceedings requires the existence of one or more of the following factors: first, 
the proceedings undertaken or ongoing or the national decision was made for the 
purpose of shielding the accused from being held criminally responsible for the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC; second, if there has been an unjustifiable 
delay in the proceedings that in the circumstances displays an intent that is inconsis-
tent with bringing the accused to justice; third, whether proceedings undertaken or 
that are ongoing were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, 
and that in the circumstances they were or are being conducted in a manner which is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice).
119  Id. at art. 17(3) (providing that a determination that a state is unable to carry out 
proceedings the court will consider whether as a result of “a total or substantial col-
lapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceedings.”).
120  Id. at arts. 17(1)(a) and (b); 17(2)-(3); see also Cryer, et al., supra note 108, at 128 
(discussing how inaction by national authorities should alleviate concerns about the 
ICC exercising jurisdiction).
121  Id. at art. 17(1)(d).
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and the common elements of either a crime against humanity or war 
crime are present then such a crime has been committed. To establish 
that a crime against humanity or war crime has been committed, the act 
of torture must also meet the specific elements of this prohibited act.
 Finally, although international criminal law is primarily 
concerned with individual responsibility, this report focuses on the 
overall situation in eastern Burma and the need for further investigations. 
This focus reflects the fact that a referral to the ICC by the UN Security 
Council under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute refers an overall 
“situation.”122 The referral process does not allow for a targeted referral 
of a specific individual or group. Further, the present analysis is aimed at 
establishing whether there is a prima facie case for further investigation. 
Thus, certain common elements of the crimes (such as whether they 
are widespread or systematic or taking place in the context of an armed 
conflict) are most relevant to this report’s analysis. Other elements (such 
as intent or knowledge of particular perpetrators) are more relevant 
to determinations of individual responsibility. Elements that are more 
relevant to individual responsibility would be determined at later 
stages of the process, meaning during and after the investigation of a 
Commission of Inquiry or during ICC proceedings following referral. 
What follows is a discussion of the crimes with a particular focus on 
the most relevant general criteria for establishing a prima facie case for 
further investigation.
A. Crimes against Humanity: Chapeau or Common 
Elements
 Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute provides that “crimes against 
humanity” means one of a number of prohibited acts when committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack. Crimes against humanity can 
stem from a number of prohibited acts, including rape and torture by a 
given perpetrator. The chapeau or common elements of a crime against 
humanity are as follows: (1) there must be an “attack”;123 (2) the attack 
122  Id. at art. 13(b).
123  See, e.g., International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. ICC-
ASP/1/3(part II-B), adopted 9 Sept. 2002 (hereinafter Elements) (detailing elements 
related to torture in Article 7(1)(f)(4) and elements of rape in Article 7(1)(g)-1(3)).
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must be “directed against”124 a “civilian population”;125 (3) the attack 
must be “widespread or systematic”;126 (4) the conduct of the perpetrator 
must be “part of ” such an attack;127 and (5) the perpetrator must have 
“knowledge” that, or intended that, his or her conduct is part of such an 
attack.128 Elements (4) and (5) focus on individual perpetrators, and as 
such are not the focus of analysis in this report, but they would ultimately 
need to be established through investigations for any prosecution to 
proceed. Thus, this report focuses on the first three of the chapeau 
elements. Important aspects of these elements for the purposes of this 
report are as follows:129
124  See, e.g., id. at 8 (detailing elements related to torture in Article 7(1)(f)(4) and 
elements of rape in Article 7(1)(g)-1(3)). Jurisprudence has expounded on the defini-
tion of “directed against”: “In order to determine whether the attack may be said to 
have been so directed, the Trial Chamber will consider, inter alia, the means and 
method used in the course of the attack, the status of the victims, their number, the 
discriminatory nature of the attack, the nature of the crimes committed in its course, 
the resistance to the assailants at the time and the extent to which the attacking force 
may be said to have complied or attempted to comply with the precautionary require-
ments of the laws of war.” Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic., ICTY Case No. 
IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-T, Appeals Chambers Judgment, ¶ 91 (Jun. 12, 2002).
125  See, e.g., Elements, supra note 123, at 8 (detailing elements related to torture in 
Article 7(1)(f)(4) and elements of rape in Article 7(1)(g)-1(3)). The definition of 
“civilian population” is straightforward: “In other words, apart from members of 
the armed forces, everybody physically present in a territory is a civilian.” Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 Jun. 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 611 
¶ 1917 (1987).  
126  See, e.g., Elements, supra note 123, at 8 (detailing elements related to torture in 
Article 7(1)(f)(4) and elements of rape in Article 7(1)(g)-1(3)). 
127  See, e.g., id. at 8 (detailing elements related to torture in Article 7(1)(f)(4) and 
elements of rape in Article 7(1)(g)-1(3)); see also Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Marti-
novic.; ICTY Case No. IT-98-34-T, Trial Chambers Judgment, ¶ 234 (Mar. 31, 2003) 
(“The acts of the accused must not be isolated but form part of the attack. This means 
that the act, by its nature or consequence, must objectively be a part of the attack.”).       
128  See, e.g., Elements, supra note 123, at 8 (detailing elements related to torture in 
Article 7(1)(f)(5) and elements of rape in Article 7(1)(g)-1(4)); see also Prosecutor v. 
Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 
¶ 134 (May 21, 1999), (“[P]art of what transforms an individual’s act(s) into a crime 
against humanity is the inclusion of the act within a greater dimension of criminal 
conduct; therefore an accused should be aware of this greater dimension in order to 
be culpable thereof.” ). 
129  See supra the discussion in the methodology section of this report for the explana-
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1. There must be an “attack”.
 An “attack” means a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of prohibited acts.130 An attack does not necessarily require 
the use of armed force, and can result solely from the mistreatment of the 
civilian population.131 
2. The attack must be “directed against” a “civilian 
population”.
 “A civilian population” envisions “any” relatively large body of 
victims and excludes isolated acts against individuals.132 
3. The attack must be “widespread or systematic”.
 The attack must be widespread or systematic; it does not need 
to be both widespread and systematic. “Widespread” generally means a 
large-scale attack with numerous victims,133 while “systematic” denotes a 
“high degree of organization”134 or “a pattern or methodical plan”.135 This 
requirement applies to the general attack. This element does not require 
that the accused personally committed multiple offences. An accused is 
tion of this focus.
130  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 7(2)(a).
131  See, e.g., Elements, supra note  123, at 5 (Introduction to Crimes Against Human-
ity); see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23 & 
IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 415 (Feb. 22, 2001) (“An ‘attack’ can be 
described as a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence.”).
132  Cryer, et al., supra note 108, at 192.
133  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, supra note 131, at ¶¶ 427-28 
(“The attack must be either “widespread” or “systematic”, thereby excluding isolated 
and random acts. The adjective “widespread” connotes the large-scale nature of the 
attack and the number of its victims.”) (Footnotes omitted).
134  Id. at ¶ 429 (Feb. 22,  2001) (“The adjective “systematic” signifies the organised 
nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence. Pat-
terns of crimes—that is the nonaccidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a 
regular basis—are a common expression of such systematic occurrence.”) (Footnotes 
omitted).
135  Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case no. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 648 
(May 7, 1997).
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criminally liable for a single inhumane act such as murder provided that 
the act was committed as part of the broader attack.136 
B. War Crimes: Chapeau or Common Elements
 A war crime is a serious violation of international humanitarian 
law (IHL), or the laws of war, which can give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility under international law.137 IHL seeks to regulate the 
conduct of armed conflicts.138 Of the Rome Statute provisions on war 
crimes the most relevant to Burma are Articles 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e), which 
cover serious violations in conflicts of a “non-international” (or internal) 
character.139 A war crime can be committed in either an international 
armed conflict or one of internal character with some differences in 
the rules applicable to each. The situation in Burma falls into the latter 
category. To constitute a war crime in the context of an internal armed 
conflict, the act must be committed against persons taking “no active part 
in the hostilities.”140 A war crime involves a perpetrator committing one 
of a number of prohibited acts, such as rape or torture, in a situation that 
meets certain common elements. The common elements relevant to the 
war crimes in this report are: (1) there must be an “armed conflict”;141 
136  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez., ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-A., App. 
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 94 (Dec. 17, 2004) (“The Appeals Chamber underscores that 
the acts of the accused need only be a part of this attack, and all other conditions be-
ing met, a single or limited number of acts on his or her part would qualify as a crime 
against humanity, unless those acts may be said to be isolated or random.”). 
137  See, e.g., Brandon and Du Plessis, The prosecution of International Crimes, 
A Practical Guide to Prosecuting ICC Crimes in Commonwealth States 
(2005); see also Cryer, et al., supra note 108.   
138  Cryer, et al., supra note 108, at 223.  
139  See Rome Statute, supra note 106, at arts. 8(2)(c) and 8(2)(e). Article 8(2)(e) of the 
Statute provides a list of “other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable 
in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established frame-
work of international law.” Id.
140   This includes “members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause.” See Rome 
Statute, supra note 106,, at art. 8(2)(c). 
141  See, e.g., Elements, supra note 123, at 34 (detailing elements related to murder in 
Article 8(2)(c)(i)-1(4)); id. at 39  (detailing elements of rape in Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-1-
1(3)); see also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23 
and IT-96-23/1 ICTY, App. Chambers Judgment, ¶ 56, (Jun. 12, 2002) (“An ‘armed 
conflict’ is said to exist ‘whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
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(2) the armed conflict must be determined as either “international”142 
or “internal” in nature as each have different elements; (3) an “internal” 
conflict must be more than a “riot” or “disturbance”;143 (4) certain criteria, 
such as age or civilian status, may also exist with regards to the victim (or 
object) of specific crime;144 (5) the crime must have a “nexus” with the 
conflict;145 and (6) the perpetrator “must have awareness of the factual 
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.”146 The 
final element—requiring the awareness of the particular perpetrator—
would have to be determined by an investigation into their individual 
knowledge, and is therefore less relevant for this particular report. 
Important aspects of the remaining chapeau elements relevant to this 
report are as follows:147
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.”).
142  See, e.g., Elements, supra note 123, at 34 (detailing elements related to murder 
in Article 8(2)(c)(i)-1(4)); id. at 39 (detailing elements of rape in Article 8(2)(e)
(vi)-1-1(3)). An international armed conflict exists if one state uses force against 
another state or cases of total or partial occupation. Common Article 2 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 defines it through providing that the Conventions apply “to all 
cases of declared war on any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if a state of war is not recognized by one 
of them. See, e.g., Dieter Fleck, The Handbook of International Humanitarian 
Law, 46 (2008).  
143  See, e.g., Elements, supra note 123, at 34 (detailing elements related to murder in 
Article 8(2)(c)(i)-1(4)); id. at 39 (detailing elements of rape in Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-1-
1(3)). 
144  See, e.g., id. at 34 (detailing elements related to murder in Article 8(2)(c)(i)-1(2) 
specifying that the victim(s) were “either hors de combat, or were civilians, medical 
personnel, or religious personnel taking no active part in the hostilities.”).
145  See, e.g., id. at 35 (detailing elements related to torture in Article 8(2)(c)(i)-4(5) 
which states the requirement that “the conduct took place in the context of and was 
associated with” an internal conflict); see also Prosecutor v. Tadić ICTY App. Cham-
ber Decision, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 69 (Oct. 2, 1995) (“The nexus required is only a 
relationship between the conflict and the deprivation of liberty, not that the depriva-
tion occurred in the midst of battle.”).
146  See, e.g., Elements, supra note 123, at 35 (detailing elements related to torture in 
Article 8(2)(c)(i)-4(6)); id. at 150 (detailing elements of rape in Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-
1(4)). The individual, however, is not required to be aware of whether the conflict is 
international or internal in nature. See id. at 39.
147  See the discussion in the methodology section of this report for the explanation of 
this focus.
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1. There must be an internal armed conflict 
(chapeau elements (1)-(3)).
 The test of an armed conflict is an objective one; the denial of 
one or more of the parties of its existence is not determinative.148 Article 
8(2)(f) defines non-international (or internal) armed conflicts as “armed 
conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted 
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups.”149 However, to be recognized as an 
internal armed conflict, a situation must meet a threshold requirement 
of intensity and organization of amounting to more than a mere internal 
disturbance or riot.150
2. The specific criteria defining the victim or object of 
the crime. 
 As noted above war crimes can only be committed, in the context 
of an internal armed conflict, against “persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities.”151 However, some war crimes specify a particular victim 
within this category, for example children or a civilian population.152
148  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. ICTR-
96-4, ¶ 624 (Sept. 2, 1998) (the conditions governing the application of Additional 
Protocol II “have to be applied objectively, irrespective of the subjective conclusions 
of the parties involved in the conflict.”).
149  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 8(2)(f); see also Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR 
Trial Chamber judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, ¶¶ 247-248 (Jan. 27, 2000) (“[N]
on-international armed conflicts are situations in which hostilities break out between 
armed forces or organized armed groups within the territory of a single State.”).
150  See Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 8(2)(d) and (f) (stating that Articles 8(2)
(c) and (e) do not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as 
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.”); see 
also Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindan, supra note 128, at ¶ 171 (“Certain types 
of internal conflicts, which fall below a minimum threshold, are not recognised by 
Article 1(2) of Protocol II as non-international armed conflict, namely, ‘situations 
of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of 
violence and other acts of a similar nature.’”).
151  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 8(2)(c).
152  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindan, supra note 128, at ¶¶  605-08 
(The enumerated Articles of Protocol II would protect “interned or detained persons, 
deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict,” “wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked persons,” “religious and medical personnel,” as well as the civilian 
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3. There must be a “nexus” between the crime and 
the armed conflict.
 The nexus requirement makes clear that a prohibited act must 
be connected or “associated with” the armed conflict: this does not 
necessitate that such acts take place in battle or require a particularized 
geographic connection to the conflict; it requires only that they have an 
association with the conflict.153
 In addition to the above elements, the Rome Statutes also 
includes a threshold requirement for the ICC to act in relation to war 
crimes. Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC “shall 
have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed 
as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such 
crimes.”154 This is an indicator to the ICC as to how it should exercise 
its jurisdiction.155 It is a direction to focus resources not on isolated war 
crimes but on the most serious of situations.156 However, this is a “guide 
rather than a requirement.” 157 The ICC remains able to act with respect 
to isolated war crimes which attain a sufficient level of gravity such as 
crimes with a particularly grave impact. 158 The terms “large-scale” or 
“plan or policy” are at a minimum synonymous with and may be less 
demanding than the common elements under crimes against humanity, 
namely “widespread” or “systematically” respectively.159 
C. Enumerated or Prohibited Acts
 Crimes against humanity and war crimes are distinct, though at 
times, a prohibited act may result in violations that display the requisite 
population and individual civilians.).
153  See, e.g., Elements, supra note 123, at 35 (detailing elements related to torture in 
Article 8(2)(c)(i)-4(5) which states the requirement that “the conduct took place in 
the context of and was associated with” an internal conflict); see also Prosecutor v. 
Tadić, supra note 145, at ¶ 69.
154  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 8(1).
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elements of both crimes. They have distinct underlying chapeau or 
common elements, as discussed above. One key distinction is that war 
crimes occur in times of an armed conflict, whereas for crimes against 
humanity the act need not occur during an armed conflict. In addition to 
determining the necessary common elements of either a war crime or a 
crime against humanity, consideration is required of whether a particular 
act—such as murder, rape, or pillage—has been committed. This requires 
the evaluation of the specific elements that belong to that particular act. 
Only acts recognized as “prohibited” (or “enumerated”) can result in a 
crime against humanity or war crime. Finally, this report focuses on the 
elements of the prohibited acts that are relevant for the determination 
of whether there is a prima facie case that such violations are occurring. 
Thus, factors such as the establishment of whether the perpetrator had 
the required mens rea are not examined in this report.
 This report focuses on the following four types of human rights 
violations: (1) forced displacement; (2) sexual violence; (3) extrajudicial 
killings, and (4) torture. The list that follows outlines the prohibited acts 
included in the Rome Statute that are most relevant to these four types of 
violations: (1) forced transfer of population; (2) rape and sexual violence; 
(3) murder, and (4) torture. These prohibited acts do not represent 
an exhaustive list of possible Rome Statute violations committed in 
Burma. Of note, the UN documents referenced in this report include 
many additional human rights abuses that may amount to prohibited 
acts under the Rome Statute or customary international law.160 The four 
prohibited acts focused on this report are:
1) Forced Transfer of Population: Under Article 7(1)(d)161 of 
the Rome Statute the crime against humanity of deportation 
or forcible transfer of population refers to the forced 
displacement of persons by expulsion or other coercive acts 
from the area in which they are lawfully present. This means 
that the displacement is committed in the absence of grounds 
permitted under international law for the removal or that 
the reason for the displacement is not the security needs of 
160  See e.g., Chart D, Human Rights Abuses Committed by Burma’s Military Regime, 
Already Documented by the United Nations and Prohibited by the Rome Statute. Other 
examples of violations include arbitrary arrest and detention, forced labor and traf-
ficking in persons.
161  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 7(1)(d) .
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the given population.162 The war crime of displacing civilians 
under Article 8(2)(e)(viii) of the Rome Statute163 requires 
that the perpetrator ordered the displacement of a civilian 
population, and that this order was not justified by the 
security of the civilians or by military necessity.164
2) Rape and Sexual Violence: The Rome Statute prohibits 
two separate offences of sexual violence and rape as a 
crime against humanity in Article 7(1)(g),165 and as war 
crime under Article 8(2)(e)(vi).166 Rape as both a crime 
against humanity and as a war crime is defined as the 
perpetrator invading the body of the victim that results in 
the penetration, however slight, of any part of the victim 
or perpetrator’s body with a sexual organ.167 Alternatively, 
the perpetrator committed vaginal or anal penetration of 
162  See Elements, supra note 123, at 7 (Article 7(1)(d)(1)-(2)); see also Prosecutor 
v. Blaskic, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 234 (Mar. 3, 2000) 
(“The deportation or forcible transfer of civilians [as a form of the crime of persecu-
tion] means ‘forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other 
coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds 
permitted under international law.’”). The final specific element is that “[t]he perpe-
trator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the lawfulness of such 
presence.” Elements, supra note 123, at 7 (Article 7(1)(d)(3)).
163  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 8(2)(e)(viii).
164  See Elements, supra note 123, at 41 (Article 8(2)(e)(viii)(1)-(2)). The final specific 
element is that “[t]he perpetrator was in a position to effect such displacement by 
giving such order.” Id. at 41 (Article 8(2)(e)(viii)(3)); see also Prosecutor v. Naletilic 
and Martinovic, supra note 127, at ¶¶ 519-21 (“Forcible transfer is the movement 
of individuals under duress from where they reside to a place that is not of their 
choosing.” “In order [for] the Chamber to be satisfied [that] Article 2(g) of the Statute 
[has been proven], proof of the following is required: i) the general requirements of 
Article 2 of the Statute . . . ; ii) the occurrence of an act or omission, not motivated by 
the security of the population or imperative military reasons, lead[s] to the transfer 
of a person from occupied territory or within occupied territory; iii) the intent of 
the perpetrator to transfer a person.” “The Prosecution needs to prove the intent to 
have the person (or persons) removed, which implies the aim that the person is not 
returning.”).
165  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 7(1)(g).
166  See id. at art. 8(2)(e)(vi).
167  See Elements, supra note 123, at 8 (Article 7(1)(g)-1(1)); id. at 39 (Article 8(2)(e)
(vi)-1(1)).
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the victim’s body with any object or any part of the body.168 
Sexual violence, as both a crime against humanity and a war 
crime requires that “[t]he perpetrator committed an act of 
a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused such 
person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature.”169 
Both the crime against humanity and war crime of sexual 
violence must also meet a certain gravity threshold. This 
threshold requires that the act of sexual violence is of 
comparable gravity to other violations such as rape, enforced 
pregnancy, or enforced sterilization.170 The key element of 
both the crime of rape and sexual violence is that there is 
a lack of consent, which requires assessing whether the act 
is committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion. 
Evidence of lack of consent can include: fear of violence, 
duress, detention, psychological oppression, or abuse 
of power against the victim or another person or by the 
perpetrator taking advantage of a coercive environment, or 
that the victim was incapable of giving genuine consent.171
3) Murder: The prohibited act of murder is found in the Rome 
Statute’s Article 7(1)(a) as a crime against humanity,172 
and Article 8(2)(c)(i)173 as a war crime in the context of an 
armed conflict not of an international character respectively. 
Either as a crime against humanity and as a war crime the 
prohibited act of murder refers to the unlawful (that is not 
resulting from a fair trial where the defendant has been 
found guilty) killing or causing the death of one or more 
person.174 
168  See id.
169  See id. at 10 (Article 7(1)(g)-6(1)); id. at 41 (Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-6(1)).
170  See id.
171  See id. at 8 (Article 7(1)(g)-1(2)); id. at 39 (Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-1(2)); id. at 10 (Ar-
ticle 7(1)(g)-6(1); id. at 41 (Article 8(2)(e)(vi)-6(1)).
172  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 7(1)(a).
173  Id. at art. 8(2)(c)(i).
174  See Elements, supra note 123, at 5 (Article 7(1)(a)(1)) and fn.7 (“The term ‘killed’ 
is interchangeable with the term ‘caused death’. This footnote applies to all elements 
which use either of these concepts.”); id. at 33 (Article 8(2)(c)(i)-1(1)); see also 
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 148, at ¶ 589 (“The Chamber defines murder as the 
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4) Torture: Torture is prohibited as a crime against humanity 
in Article 7(1)(f)175 and as a war crime in the context of an 
armed conflict not of an international character in Article 
8(c)(i) of the Rome Statute.176 Torture is the infliction of 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering.177 For the act to 
constitute a crime against humanity the victim must have 
been in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator, 
and this pain or suffering caused must not be the inherent 
or accidental result of a lawful sanction.178 To constitute 
a war crime the perpetrator must have inflicted the pain 
and suffering with the purpose of, for example, “obtaining 
information or a confession, punishment, intimidation 
or coercion, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
unlawful, intentional killing of a human being.”).
175  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 7(1)(f).
176  Id. at art. 8(2)(c)(i).
177  See Elements, supra note 123, at 8 (Article 7(1)(f)(1) and (3)); id. at 35 (Article 
8(2)(c)(i)-4(1)). The final specific element of torture as a crime against humanity is 
that “[s]uch person or persons were in the custody or under the control of the perpe-
trator.” Id. at 8 (Article 7(1)(f)(2)). The final specific element of torture as a war crime 
in the context of an internal conflict is that “[t]he perpetrator inflicted the pain or 
suffering for such purposes as: obtaining information or a confession, punishment, 
intimidation or coercion or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” Id. 
at 35 (Article 8(2)(c)(i)-4(2)); see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, supra note 148, at ¶¶ 
593-95 and 681 (“The Tribunal interprets the word ‘torture’. . . in accordance with 
the definition of torture set forth in the United Nations Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.” “The Chamber 
defines the essential elements of torture as: (i) The perpetrator must intentionally 
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon the victim for one or more 
of the following purposes: (a) to obtain information or a confession from the victim 
or a third person; (b) to punish the victim or a third person for an act committed 
or suspected of having been committed by either of them; (c) for the purpose of 
intimidating or coercing the victim or the third person; (d) for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind.); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic,  supra note 
141, at ¶ 142 (“The definition of torture has the following elements: “(i) The inflic-
tion, by act or omission, of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental . . 
. (iii) The act or omission must aim at obtaining information or a confession, or at 
punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at discriminat-
ing, on any ground, against the victim or a third person.”).
178  See Elements, supra note 123, at 8 (Article 7(1)(f)(2) and (3)).
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any kind.”179 Under the Rome Statute, the perpetrator does 
not have to be a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.180 
179  See id. at 35 (Article 8(2)(c)(i)-4(2)).
180  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Semanza, ICTR Trial Chamber Judgment, Case No. ICTR-
97-20-T, ¶¶ 342-343, (May 15, 2003) (“In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber relied on the 
definition of torture found in the . . . Convention Against Torture. . . . The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has since explained that while the definition contained in the 
Convention Against Torture is reflective of customary international law . . . , it is not 
identical to the definition of torture as a crime against humanity. [T]he ICTY Ap-
peals Chamber has confirmed that, outside the framework of the Convention Against 
Torture, the ‘public official’ requirement is not a requirement under customary in-
ternational law in relation to individual criminal responsibility for torture as a crime 
against humanity. Thus, the Chamber rejected the ‘public official’ requirement.”).
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III.  Human Rights 
Violations in Burma
 This section traces the discussion in UN documents issued 
since 2002 of the violations of forced displacement, sexual violence, 
extrajudicial killings, and torture reported as occurring in eastern Burma. 
The information included in these documents displays both a consistent 
pattern of violations and highlights a deteriorating situation in eastern 
Burma. The pattern and manner of the reported violations strongly 
suggests that the violations discussed constitute international crimes. 
Thus, the analysis of the UN documents provides a prima facie case for 
the existence of such crimes, and justifies the establishment of a UN 
Security Council mandated Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
situation further. 
Repeated and Long-Term UN Condemnation of Serious Human Rights 
Violations in Burma
 A number of actors within the UN system have consistently 
condemned the reports of grave human rights and humanitarian 
violations occurring across Burma as a whole. Since 1992 the Myanmar 
Rapporteur, General Assembly, and Commission on Human Rights have 
repeatedly noted the occurrence of such violations. See Charts A (Human 
Rights Violations Listed by General Assembly Resolutions), B (Human 
Rights Violations Listed by Commission on Human Rights and Human 
Rights Council Resolutions), and C (Human Rights Violations Listed 
by Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights 
in Myanmar). This underscores the long-term nature and broad pattern 
of grave humanitarian violations occurring throughout Burma, and the 
UN’s awareness of the situation.
 Various UN General Assembly resolutions issued between 
1992 and 2008 have consistently identified a list of grave human rights 
violations occurring on Burmese territory, including forced displacement, 
sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, and torture. See Chart A. For 
example, in 1994, the General Assembly expressed itself to be gravely 
concerned about:
[T]he continued violations of human rights in Myanmar, 
as reported by the Special Rapporteur, in particular 
summary and arbitrary executions, torture . . . and forced 
relocations, abuse of women . . . and the imposition of 
oppressive measures directed in particular at ethnic and 
religious minorities[.]181
 More recent General Assembly resolutions allude to similar 
violations, and indeed, UN condemnation has continued through to 
the most recent resolution in 2008. See Chart A. In the 2007 Resolution 
61/232, the General Assembly expressed grave concern about the ongoing 
human rights violations in Myanmar, including the:
[D]iscrimination and violations suffered by persons 
belonging to ethnic nationalities of Myanmar, including 
extrajudicial killings, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence persistently carried out by members of the 
armed forces; the continuing use of torture . . . and 
the prevailing culture of impunity; (b) The attacks by 
military forces on villages in Karen State and other 
ethnic States in Myanmar, leading to extensive forced 
displacements and serious violations of the human rights 
of the affected populations[.]182
 The General Assembly has also moved from “strongly urg[ing]” 
in 2004,183 to “call[ing] upon” in 2005184 to “strongly call[ing] upon” in 
2006185 the Burmese authorities to take various specified steps to prevent 
further violations. The UN Commission on Human Rights has also 
echoed its concern for the same reported violations in its resolutions 
issued since 2002. For example, in 2005 the Commission expressed its 
181  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 49/197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/197 
(Dec. 23, 1994).
182  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 61/232, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/232 
(Mar. 13, 2007).
183  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 58/247, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/58/247, ¶ 5 (Mar. 11, 2004). 
184  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 59/263, U.N. Doc, A/
RES/59/263, ¶ 3 (Mar. 17, 2005).
185  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 60/233, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/60/233, ¶ 3 (Mar. 23, 2006).
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grave concern about:
Extrajudicial killings, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence persistently carried out by members of the 
armed forces, continuing use of torture . . . forced 
relocation . . . disrespect for the rule of law and lack of 
independence of the judiciary[.]186
 In March 2008, the Human Rights Council went further stating 
that it “[s]trongly deplores the ongoing systematic violations of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Myanmar[.]”187 Against 
this backdrop of the repeated expression of concern about a wide-
ranging list of human rights violations by UN actors, the remainder of 
this chapter evaluates the UN documentation of the situation in eastern 
Burma with respect to specific prohibited acts under the Rome Statute. 
A.  Forced Displacement 
 The UN documentation of forced displacement creates a prima 
facie case for a UN investigation into its occurrence. The chronicling 
of such violations has not only been consistent since 2002 but has also 
highlighted deterioration in the situation since 2004. The UN has also 
raised particular concerns about the escalation of attacks in 2006. The 
long-term nature and severity of the violations reported, as well as their 
perpetration by military forces in order to control the ethnic nationality 
population, strongly suggests that the violations may constitute 
international crimes. 
 The UN has extensively documented the crisis of internal 
displacement in Burma. Since 1992, the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in Myanmar (hereinafter Myanmar 
Rapporteur), General Assembly, and Commission on Human Rights have 
repeatedly noted the occurrence of such violations in relation to Burma 
as a whole. See Charts A, B, and C. This highlights the long-term pattern 
of forced displacement. The Myanmar Rapporteur has observed that the 
186  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, Comm’n on H.R. Res. 2005/10, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/10, ¶ 3 (Apr. 14, 2005).
187  Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Hum. Rts. Coun.Res. 7/31, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/7/31, ¶ 1 (Mar. 28, 2008).
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Burmese army has “approximately doubled” the number of battalions 
deployed across eastern Burma since 1995.188 Ten years of military 
campaigns in ethnic nationality areas in eastern Burma targeting civilians 
has been considered connected with the widespread practice of land 
confiscation throughout the country.189 This has resulted in numerous 
forced evictions, relocations, and resettlements as well as forced 
migration and internal displacement.190 The attacks on villages have led 
to extensive forced displacements in Karen, Mon, Shan, and Karenni 
States.191 Based on “reliable and independent sources,” the Myanmar 
Rapporteur documented reports of an estimated 3,077 separate incidents 
of destruction, relocation, or abandonment of villages in eastern Burma 
between 1996 and 2006.192 During this time, it was “understood that 
over a million people” were displaced.193 Further, he noted that “[a]s of 
November 2006, the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
who were forced or obliged to leave their homes and have not been able 
to return or resettle and reintegrate into society is estimated to be at least 
500,000.”194 In 2007, however, the government was noted to be refusing 
to recognize the existence of IDPs within its borders and was severely 
restricting UN and other humanitarian actors’ access to them.195 
1. The Scale of Forced Displacement
 UN documentation consistently provides reports of the Burmese 
army’s destruction of ethnic nationality villages and the subsequent flow 
of displaced persons. In addition, the level of concern emanating from 
the UN reports has increased. The reports of the Myanmar Rapporteur 
highlight a deteriorating situation from 2004 onwards. He stated that as 
188  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Imple-
mentation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human 
Rights Council”: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/14, ¶ 54 (Feb. 12, 
2007) (hereinafter Myanmar Rapporteur 2007).
189  Id. at 4.
190  Id. 
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of the end of 2004:
[T]here were at least 526,000 internally displaced persons 
in eastern Myanmar alone, in Mon, Karen, [Karenni], 
Southern Shan states and [Tenasserim] and Eastern 
[Pegu] divisions. The Special Rapporteur is concerned 
about reports that allege that 365,000 people are in 
temporary settlements in ceasefire areas controlled by 
ethnic minority groups; 84,000 civilians are reportedly 
in hiding or temporary settlements, having been forcibly 
evicted from their homes; and a further 77,000 are 
understood to have been moved to relocation sites by 
Government troops. It is believed that at least 1 million 
people are internally displaced countrywide.196 
 The Myanmar Rapporteur observed further deterioration 
through 2005 and 2006.197 This was a “direct result of systematic human 
rights abuses and the conflict between the military authorities and non-
State armed groups.”198 The Myanmar Rapporteur documented that “[o]
ver a million people are understood to have been displaced from their 
homes during this time (between 1996 and 2006). As of November 
2006, the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have 
been forced or obliged to leave their homes and have not been able to 
return or resettle and reintegrate into society is estimated to be at least 
500,000.”199 The Myanmar Rapporteur drew specific attention to reports 
of 3,000 people crossing the border to Thailand since the beginning of 
2006 because of the military campaign in Karen State.200 He reported a 
196  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Interim 
report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation 
of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/221, 
¶ 83 (Aug. 12, 2005) (hereinafter Myanmar Rapporteur 2005).
197  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Question of 
the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World: 
Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/34, ¶ 104 (Feb. 7, 
2006) (hereinafter Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 II).
198  Id. at ¶ 99.
199  Myanmar Rapporteur 2007, supra note 188, at ¶ 54.
200  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 45.
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“total of 540,000 internally displaced persons in eastern Burma who were 
described as having minimum prospects of return and resettlement.”201 
One particular incident that the Myanmar Rapporteur detailed occurred 
in Karen State in November 2005.202 He reported that 900 people had 
fled the town of Thandaung, following an attack by government forces, 
which resulted in the burning of civilian dwellings and the laying of 
landmines.203 According to the Rapporteur, as of the beginning of 2006, 
“these 900 civilians, many of whom were children, were in hiding without 
adequate food or shelter.”204 The Myanmar Rapporteur also described 
receiving testimonies from villagers who had recently fled Toungoo 
District and eastern Pegu Division.205 He observed that the testimonies 
from these villagers, who had been forcibly displaced on several 
occasions, verified the allegations that he had previously received in 2006 
regarding the magnitude of the humanitarian and human rights situation 
in these areas.206 He concluded that as a consequence of the increased 
number of military operations, “the number of communities in need, 
such as villagers facing food shortage, internally displaced villagers and 
refugees significantly increased in 2006.”207 
 In 2006, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, (hereinafter Executions Rapporteur) provided a 
similar description of forced displacement in a letter to the Burmese 
authorities regarding the situation of ethnic nationality villagers in 
northern Karen state and east of Pegu Division.208 According to the 
information the Executions Rapporteur had received, the villagers were 
201  Id.
202  Special Rapporteur, supra note 197, at ¶ 104.
203  Id.
204  Id.
205  Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHRCHR], 
UN Human Rights expert urged the Government of Myanmar to authorize access to 
affected areas by humanitarian actors (Feb. 23, 2007)(hereinafter Press Release 2007).
206  Id.
207  Id.
208  The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Imple-
mentation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human 
Rights Council”: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbi-
trary executions: Addendum: Summary of cases transmitted to Government and replies 
received, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/20/Add.1, 222-23 (Mar. 12, 2007) (including letter of 
allegation dated May 15, 2006 sent with the Special Rapporteur on the situation of 
human rights in Myanmar) (hereinafter Executions  Rapporteur 2007).
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at risk of human rights violations following a recent escalation in attacks 
against armed elements of ethnic nationality groups.209 For several weeks, 
thousands of civilians had reportedly fled their homes to hide in the 
forest or seek asylum in Thailand.210 In the ongoing military operations 
in Karen State, the Burmese military had reportedly attacked villages 
and ordered villagers to relocate.211 The Executions Rapporteur noted 
that“[c]oncerns have been expressed that counter-insurgency operations 
will continue to intensify as the Burmese authorities reportedly stated in 
April 2006 that the government has taken ‘security measures’ against the 
KNU and that places where ‘destructive elements’ can hide were being   
cleared.” 212
 UN actors also issued a press release in 2006 about the reports of 
forced displacement and the concerns that they raised. A group of six UN 
Rapporteurs and experts released a joint statement in May 2006213 about 
the targeting of civilians during operations against armed elements of 
ethnic nationality groups in the northern Karen and eastern Pegu areas.214 
The release stated that the operations had resulted in the forcible eviction 
and displacement of thousands of ethnic nationality villagers.215 The 
experts raised “deep concern” regarding the “widespread violence that has 
continued to spiral for the last six months in the Thandaung and Papun 
townships of Karen state as well as Kyaukgyi and Shwegyin townships of 
Pegu Division.”216 Further, homes had been demolished with no provision 
of alternate housing or compensation.217




213  Press Release, UN Human Rights Experts Call on Myanmar to End Counter-
Insurgency Operations Targeting Civilians in Northern Karen State and Eastern 
Pegu Division (May 16, 2006) (hereinafter Press Release 2006). The experts included: 
Myanmar Rapporteur, Independent Expert on minority issues, the Special Rappor-
teur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the 
Special Rapporteur on adequate housing, the Special Rapporteur on the right to food 
and the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health. Id.; see also Special Rapporteur, 
supra note 3, at ¶ 46.
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 For the period of 2006 to 2007, the Myanmar Rapporteur 
again raised concern over reports of human rights violations in Karen 
State, which included the forced displacement of civilians by the armed 
forces.218 He documented reports that over 40,000 villagers had been 
internally displaced in Karen State and thousands rendered homeless in 
the “past months” referring to the recent military offenses.219 Further, he 
stated the following:
Widespread violence increased in 2007 in mountain 
areas outside military control in the Toungoo, 
Nyaunglebin and Papun Districts and in eastern [Pegu] 
Division. For reliable observers, this is the worst 
humanitarian situation since the 1996-1997 military 
campaign.220
 In October 2007, sources estimated that the total number of 
internally displaced persons in eastern Burma was 503,000.221 These 
included 295,000 people in ceasefire zones, 99,000 in hiding in the 
jungle and 109,000 elsewhere in Burma, including in relocation sites.222 
It was based on these figures that the Myanmar Rapporteur again 
concluded that the situation was deteriorating.223 As of the end of 2008, 
UN documents did not indicate that there had been an improvement 
in the situation. The Myanmar Rapporteur reported meeting with an 
unspecified number of civilians who had travelled to Thailand in April 
2008.224 The report states that their villages had been “burnt down during 
military offensives and they had lost their houses and livelihoods and had 
218  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human right in Myanmar, Human 
Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention: Report of the Special Rappor-
teur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, 
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/18, ¶ 80 (Mar. 7, 2008) (hereinafter 
Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I).
219  Id. at ¶ 77.
220  Id. at ¶ 80.
221  Id. at ¶ 69.
222  Id. 
223  Id. at ¶ 72. 
224  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/341, ¶ 57 (Sept. 5, 2008) (hereinafter Myanmar 
Rapporteur 2008 II).
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therefore been forced to flee to Thailand for survival.”225 
 Overall, since 2002, the UN actors’ reports of forced 
displacement describe a grave situation with particularly significant 
incidents outlined in 2006. In reviewing displacement over several years, 
the Myanmar Rapporteur noted:
It is estimated that since October 2004, at least 87,000 
people were obliged to leave their homes. As of late 2005, 
there were understood to be a total of 540,000 people 
displaced in eastern Myanmar alone, the area worst 
affected by armed conflict and systematic human rights 
abuses by government personnel.226 
 Finally, such forced displacement fits within a long-term pattern 
documented in eastern Burma; the Myanmar Rapporteur has provided a 
figure of the total of villages destroyed relocated or abandoned of villages 
as more than 3,000 villages since 1996.227
2. The Reasons for Forced Displacement
 In his documentation of reports of forced displacement in 
eastern Burma the Myanmar Rapporteur has also discussed the reasons 
for the army’s forced displacement of civilians in the ethnic nationality 
areas. He has consistently linked forced displacement with the armed 
conflict in such regions.228 Additionally, UN actors have often noted that  
the problem of internal displacement is a result of the military campaigns 
against armed elements of ethnic nationality groups and is deployed as 
part of the tactics aimed at breaking any connections between the armed 
opposition groups and the local civilian population.229 Specifically, the 
Myanmar Rapporteur reported that the violence had been exacerbated 
by the “counter-insurgency policy”, known as the Four Cuts Policy, which 
aimed to close any means of funding that the armed groups might have.230 
225  Id.
226  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 II, supra note 197, at ¶ 101.
227  Special Rapporteur, supra note 188, at ¶ 54.
228  See, e.g., Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 72.
229  See, e.g., Executions Rapporteur 2007, supra note 208, at 222.
230  See, e.g., The Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights on the situa-
tion of human rights in Myanmar, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the 
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In 2008, the Myanmar Rapporteur stated that he was “very concerned” 
about the “intensified military campaigns” in ethnic nationality areas of 
eastern Burma.231 
 The Myanmar Rapporteur has also reasoned that the practice 
of land confiscation, which appears to be aimed at “anchoring military 
control, especially in ethnic areas” has also led to forced displacement.232 
Further stating that the particular vulnerability of ethnic nationalities is 
linked to historic trends:
After half-a-century of low intensity civil war, many 
ethnic minorities in Myanmar living along areas 
bordering with Thailand are highly vulnerable; most 
armed ethnic groups have either agreed to ceasefires with 
the Government or been reduced to exhausted remnants 
in the jungle.233
 It is in this context that the Myanmar Rapporteur has also 
explained that the deteriorating situation from 2004 onwards was related 
to the increasing concentration of the army in eastern Burma. Reports 
received by the Myanmar Rapporteur stated that as of December 2007 
there were 187 army battalions in Karen State, in three districts, with at 
least 120 to 150 soldiers in each battalion.234 
3. The Method of Forced Displacement
 The Myanmar Rapporteur has described the army’s methods 
of forced displacement. Members of the rural populations, sometimes 
on short notice, are moved from areas of suspected or real armed 
activity to areas under army control.235 Villagers may be given only a 
few hours or days to pack essential items and move, and they are given 
Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, deliv-
ered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/290, ¶ 17 (Aug. 9, 2002) (hereinafter 
Myanmar Rapporteur 2002; and Myanmar Rapporteur,2006 II supra note 197, at ¶ 
105.
231  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 72.
232  Id.
233  Id.
234  Id. at ¶ 77.
235  Myanmar Rapporteur 2002, supra note 230, at ¶ 17.
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no compensation or material assistance.236 Prohibitions are put in place 
for returning to their villages, and if caught they may be shot on sight.237 
In 2006, the Executions Rapporteur reported that a similar method of 
operation had been brought to his attention in recent months, stating 
that some individuals had been warned that the army would exercise a 
shoot-on-sight policy against those who attempt to return to their home 
areas.238 
 The Burmese army’s effort to impoverish civilians is also a part of 
the forced displacement strategy. The Myanmar Rapporteur stated: 
In areas of conflict, there appears to be no diminution in 
the Government’s so-called “Four Cuts Policy”. . . . The 
purposeful impoverishment and deprivation of civilians 
as a counter-insurgency strategy is exercised through 
severe travel restrictions, forced evictions, expropriation, 
the imposition of arbitrary taxes and the destruction of 
villages.239 
 The Myanmar Rapporteur has further described the reported 
conditions of those forcibly displaced, which included them being placed 
in “empty tracts of land” without any assistance to build shelters.240 
Similarly, IDPs “face severe food shortages and inadequate access to 
safe drinking water, health and education services. Infant and maternal 
mortality rates are reportedly higher among the displaced.”241
4. UN Actors’ Conclusions and Recommendations 
Regarding Forced Displacement
 In 2006, the Myanmar Rapporteur concluded that the situation 
was deteriorating in eastern Burma, which included the documented 
increase in the military’s forced displacement of civilians.242  Moreover, 
the Myanmar Rapporteur declared that based on independent 
236  Id.
237  Id.
238  See, e.g., Executions Rapporteur 2007, supra note 208, at 222
239  See Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 II, supra note 197, at ¶ 105.
240  Myanmar Rapporteur 2005, supra note 196, at ¶ 84.
241  Id.
242  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 II, supra note 197, at ¶¶  82-83.
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information, he found signs leading him to believe that the practice was 
widespread and “part of a deliberate strategy.”243 He further noted that 
“[t]he current government strategy of targeting civilians in the course of 
its military operations represents a willful abrogation of its responsibility 
under international humanitarian law.”244 The Myanmar Rapporteur has 
also called upon the authorities to press for the cessation of the hostilities 
in Karen State, and for the authorities to provide full details of the alleged 
crimes in the area.245 Finally, since 2002, UN actors have called on the 
government to take “urgent measures” to end the military operations, 
especially those that target civilians in specific ethnic nationality areas 
where there is armed conflict such as the northern Karen and eastern 
Pegu areas246 but also more generally in relation to Burma as a whole.247 
5. Analysis of Forced Displacement
 The analysis of the UN documentation of reports of forced 
displacement in eastern Burma presents a prima facie case that the 
practice is taking place, and a UN Security Council constituted 
Commission of Inquiry should undertake further investigations. The 
evidence available strongly suggests that the military forces perpetration 
of prohibited acts of forced displacement in Burma constitute either 
crimes against humanity prohibited by Articles 7(1)(d) or war crimes 
prohibited by Article 8(2)(e)(viii) of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, 
the UN documents do not provide reports of accountability efforts for 
such actions as mandated by international law. Specifically, international 
law requires an independent and thorough investigation of particular 
incidents of abuse.
Common Elements
 The requirement that there be “an attack directed against a civilian 
population” has been met on its face: the UN actors have consistently 
described the victims of the forced displacement as civilians and villagers 
243  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 47. 
244  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 II, supra note 197, at ¶ 106.
245  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 80.
246  Press Release 2006, supra note 213.
247  Human Rights Council, supra note 187. 
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from ethnic nationality areas, and there have also been reports of multiple 
acts referred to as being “targeted” against them.248 
 Further, for the forced displacement to constitute a crime against 
humanity there must be a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. The Myanmar Rapporteur has described 
forced displacement as occurring in a “widespread”249 manner and as 
part of a “deliberate strategy”.250 The use of the language of international 
crimes underscores the concern raised by the persistence of the violations 
coupled with the documented marked deterioration in the situation. 
Furthermore, the documentation of the military’s Four Cuts Policy and 
the Myanmar Rapporteur’s belief that forced displacement was “part of 
a deliberate strategy” provide evidence of a “systematic” violation.251 In 
addition, the descriptions of the incidents of forced displacement suggest 
that such violations are both widespread and systematic, while a crime 
against humanity need only be widespread or systematic. The UN actors’ 
reports chronicled in the section indicate that more than 500,000 people 
may be experiencing ongoing forced displacement in eastern Burma 
alone, which amounts to “widespread” levels of the prohibited act. 
 Regarding the common elements of war crimes the UN 
documents strongly suggest that there is a situation of armed conflict in 
eastern Burma, and that the reported acts have the required nexus to an 
armed conflict. This can be established from references to “intensified 
military campaigns,” and that the transfers are occurring during armed 
conflict in ethnic minority areas,252 or as part of “counter-insurgency”.253 
The situation is an internal rather than international armed conflict, and 
the language utilized in the UN documents noted above suggests that the 
reported violence attains a level beyond mere disturbances or riots. The 
UN documentation continuously references the military forces as the 
perpetrators of the violence. The victims are also civilians or villagers, 
and thus non-combatants, who may not be targeted under IHL. 
 As noted in the legal framework section above, under the Rome 
248  See, e.g., Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 II, supra note 197, at ¶ 106.
249  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 72.
250  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3 at ¶ 47 (expressing that “based on 
independent information, he found signs leading to believe that the forced displace-
ment in eastern Burma, was widespread and “part of a deliberate strategy.”). 
251  Id.
252  Myanmar Rapporteur 2007, supra note 188, at 4.
253  See, e.g., Myanmar Rapporteur 2005, supra note 196, at ¶ 82. 
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Statute war crimes have a jurisdictional threshold that is not an element 
of the war crime in of itself. The Rome Statute indicates that war crimes 
that are committed as part of a “plan” or “policy” or part of a “large-
scale commission” of prohibited acts are to receive particular attention. 
Though different terminology is used, these labels are analogous to, 
or less demanding that those of crimes against humanity’s elements of 
“widespread or systematic.” Thus, the above discussion of the elements 
of widespread and systematic suggests that the documented reports of 
forced displacement meet this threshold.
Elements of the Prohibited Act: Force and Coercion
 Force and coercion are essential legal elements in establishing 
that a transfer of a population is unlawful and a crime against humanity. 
A similar requirement of force and coercion is required for the 
displacement to amount to a war crime. The perpetrator must have 
ordered the displacement of a civilian population, which was not justified 
on the basis of the security of this population or by military necessity. 
The description of the forced displacement of civilians suggests that these 
elements of coercion and force are present in the UN documents. They 
describe reports of the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands 
of civilians or villagers.254 They also outline the types of force reportedly 
used, such as the military issuing direct orders to civilians to flee their 
homes,255 the burning or destroying of their homes,256indirectly as the 
result of the severity of military clashes, or as a result of a “deliberate 
strategy” aimed at separating “ethnic armed groups from their civilian 
populations.”257 The Myanmar Rapporteur noted, for example, that it “has 
been considered by various observers to be a concerted policy aimed at 
denying people their livelihoods and food or forcing them to risk their 
lives when they attempt to return to their villages after having been 
forcibly evicted.”258 
254  Myanmar Rapporteur 2007, supra note 188, at ¶ 54.
255  Myanmar Rapporteur 2002, supra note 230, at ¶ 17.
256  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 II, supra note 197, at ¶ 104.
257  Myanmar Rapporteur 2007, supra note 188, at ¶ 56.
258  Id.
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Impunity
 Finally, there is the issue of impunity. None of the UN actors 
suggest that there is accountability for the reported violations of forced 
displacement. The reports of the practice of forced displacement are 
instead linked to reports of other violations, such as the “shoot on sight” 
policy, which occur within what is described as the overall “culture of 
impunity” in Burma.259 In sum, the UN documents create a strong prima 
facie case that the reported violations do constitute international crimes, 
which should require additional investigations.
B. Sexual Violence
 The UN reports of sexual violence occurring in eastern Burma 
also establish a prima facie case of potential crimes against humanity 
and war crimes that would justify further UN investigation into this 
form of abuse. Various UN actors have highlighted the long-term nature 
and severity of such violations, which the military forces commit as a 
means of controlling the civilian population in ethnic nationality areas. 
Additionally, these reported violations are perpetrated within a culture of 
impunity. Thus, the analysis of the UN documentation strongly suggests 
that the reported violations of sexual violence constitute international 
crimes. 
1. Levels of Sexual Violence
 UN reports have described the trend of sexual violence as 
“particularly alarming” because the figures provided to the Myanmar 
Rapporteur were “far lower than the reality.”260 He observed that many 
women do not report incidents of sexual violence because of the trauma 
259  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 58.
260  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30. The Special Rapporteur on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Civil and 
Political Rights, Including the Questions of Torture and Detention: Torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: Report of the Special Rappor-
teur: Addendum: Summary of information, including individual cases, transmitted to 
Governments and replies received, delivered to the U,N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECO-
SOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.1 (Mar. 21, 2006), 
153-55 (from Dec. 1, 2004 to Dec. 15, 2005) (hereinafter Torture Rapporteur 2006).
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attached to it, and some reports may have not reached him as he was 
dependent for information on human rights abuses in the ethnic 
nationality areas on that collected from refugees when they arrived at the 
Thai-Burmese border.261
 Even prior to 2002, UN actors were reporting high levels of 
sexual violence. The long-term nature of sexual violence across Burma 
is underscored by the fact that the Myanmar Rapporteur, General 
Assembly, and Commission on Human Rights have repeatedly noted 
the occurrence of such violations in Burma as a whole since 1992. See 
Charts A, B, and C. For example, the Myanmar Rapporteur stated that 
between 1996 and 2001, he received reports of the rape of 625 women 
and girls in Shan State.262 The Torture Rapporteur documented the same 
violations and observed that the allegations were made against soldiers 
from 52 different battalions.263 On many occasions there was apparently 
no attempt to conceal the bodies of dead women who were raped and 
subjected to other acts of violence.264 This trend continued in the period 
of 2002 to 2005 during which he received reports of 188 rape cases in 
Shan State. 265 The high levels of reported cases are not limited to Shan 
State but extend across eastern Burma.266  
 UN actors have consistently documented reports of high levels of 
sexual violence since 2002. The Myanmar Rapporteur noted that allegedly 
civilians in ethnic nationality areas such as Shan, Karen, Karenni, and 
Mon states had been particularly vulnerable to such violations.267 For 
example, the Myanmar Rapporteur provided documented testimonies 
received up to August 2003 regarding sixteen rape incidents, involving 25 
women, all of whom were ethnic nationalities (nineteen Shan, one Akha, 
one Palaung, and four Karen women).268 Eight of these cases took place 
261  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30.
262  Id.
263  Torture Rapporteur 2006, supra note 260, at 153.
264  Id. at 153-54.
265  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30.
266  Id. (reporting 37 cases involving sexual violence against 50 women and girls in 
Mon areas between 1995 and 2004).
267  See, e.g., Myanmar Rapporteur 2005, supra note 196, at ¶ 72.
268  The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of 
human rights in Myanmar, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/219, ¶ 58 (Aug. 5, 2003) (hereinafter Myanmar 
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in 2002.269 In addition, one Shan girl testified that she had been forced 
to marry a Tatmadaw soldier.270 All documented cases of rape received 
up until August 2003 had reportedly been committed by the Tatmadaw 
soldiers.271
 In a joint letter to the Burmese authorities in October 2002, the 
Special Rapporteur on violence against women (hereinafter Women 
Rapporteur), the Executions Rapporteur, and the Special Rapporteur on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(hereinafter Torture Rapporteur, raised concerns about specific examples 
of attacks that had taken place.272 The letter listed examples of violence 
dating from 1996 onwards. The letter referenced seven separate cases 
involving one or more victims in 2002 alone. The cases highlight the 
culture of impunity attached to sexual violence committed by the 
military:
Naw Moo Lah Aing, aged 16, and Ma Chi Win, aged 18, 
were reportedly gang-raped on 11 February 2002 in Mae 
Thraw Kee Kawkareit Township, Karen State, by troops 
from IB No. 10 under LID No. 88. The troops allegedly 
took them outside of the village, tied them up and raped 
them. No action was reportedly taken. 
On 22 July 2002, Thein Naing (Private ID No. 176399) 
and the three other soldiers from IB 62, based in 
Rapporteur 2003).  
269  Id. (the sources of information were victims themselves, friends, or relatives, 
and in some cases, people from another village had heard about the rape from the 
victims).
270  Id. 
271  Id. (In most cases, victims could not identify a name or rank of perpetrators, or 
their unit number. In some cases, victims knew where the perpetrators were based. 
Information about names, ranks, and unit numbers was mostly compiled afterwards 
with the help of other sources).
272  The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, 
Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence 
Against Women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 2002/52, delivered to the Human Rights Commission, General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.2 (Jan. 14, 2003) (hereinafter Women Rapporteur 
2003).
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Thanbyuzayat town reportedly shot and killed five Mon 
villagers in Thanbyuzayat Township, Mon State, southern 
Myanmar, after allegedly raping 16-year-old Mi Eat-Sar. 
The incident reportedly took place while Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi was visiting Mon State. Upon arrival in Galen-
Padaw village, the soldiers allegedly entered the house of 
the village headman, Nai Kun Tit, and reportedly raped 
his granddaughter Mi Eat Sar. Nai Kun Tit reportedly 
woke up while the soldiers were raping the girl. He tried 
to help her but was shot. It is reported that Mi Eat Sar 
and other members of her family were then executed.
Maw Lee Meh, a 17-year old Karenni girl, was reportedly 
raped on 25 August 2002 by a private Myint Lwin from 
SPDC LIB 530 in her house at about 12 p.m., in Daw 
Tamagyi village, Dee Maw So Township, [Karenni] State. 
According to reports, the parents reported the case to the 
responsible company commander, Major Myint Soe, but 
he allegedly dismissed the incident and threatened the 
parents.273
 For the period between 2003 and 2004, the Executions Rapporteur 
transmitted specific cases to the Burmese authorities relating to rapes by 
security forces that had resulted in multiple deaths and other attacks.274 
These included the following reported cases:
Allegation sent with the Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women and the Special Rapporteur on torture, 
21 September 2004. On 17 September 2003, Zaai Yi, 
aged 40 and originally from Nawng Hai village, Kho 
Lam village tract, [Shan State] but forcibly relocated 
273  Id. at ¶¶ 138, 143-44.
274  The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Civil 
and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearances and Summary Execu-
tions: Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions: Report of the Special Rappor-
teur: Addendum: Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received, 
delivered to the U,N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.1 (Mar. 27, 2006) (hereinafter Executions Rappor-
teur 2006). 
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to Kho Lam village relocation site in 1997, was taken 
away from his farm by a group of men believed to be 
State Peace and Develoment Council (SPDC) soldiers. 
Half an hour later, a patrol of approximately 50 SPDC 
troops from Infantry Battalion (IB) 246 came to the 
farm and interrogated his wife, Naang Kham, aged 30, 
about the whereabouts of her husband. When she told 
them that he had been abducted by unknown soldiers, 
she was accused of being the wife of a Shan soldier. 
She was reportedly beaten, kicked and gang-raped. She 
lost consciousness several times. After the troops left 
the farm, some villagers assisted her. As her condition 
worsened after this assault, she eventually fled to 
Thailand to receive medical treatment. She reportedly 
died on 29 March 2004 in Chiangrai provincial hospital, 
in Thailand. As far as the Special Rapporteurs have 
been informed, the whereabouts of her husband are still 
unknown.275
Ms. Naang Khin, aged 22, and her sister, Ms. Naang 
Lam, aged 19, were reportedly raped by a patrol of SPDC 
troops from Lai-Kha-based Light Infantry Battalion 
(LIB) 515 on 16 October 2003, when they were reaping 
rice at their farm in Wan Zing village tract [in Shan 
State]. Their father was tied up to a tree. Afterwards, the 
two sisters were taken to a forest by the troops. Their 
dead bodies were found by villagers some days later 
dumped in a hole.276
Ms. Naang Sa, aged 20, and her husband, Mr. Zaai Leng, 
aged 23, both originally from Zizawya Khe village in 
Wan Thi village tract, but relocated to Lai-Kha township 
[in Shan State] in 1997, were approached in their 
farm by about 40 SPDC troops from Co.3 of IB64 on 
26 November 2003. Zaai Leng was reportedly tied up 
outside the farm and Naang Sa gang-raped by the troops. 
275  Id. at ¶ 471.
276  Id. at ¶ 474.
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She was later taken with them. Zaai Leng and other 
villagers went to the base of IB64 to inquire about her 
but were not allowed to enter the base. Three days later, 
Naang Sa’s dead body was found near the farm.277
 In 2004, the Myanmar Rapporteur received reports of 125 
cases of rape in Karen State alleged to have occurred over a year and 
a half period. 278 Regarding the following year of 2006, the Myanmar 
Rapporteur received information about 30 cases of rape against Chin 
women in western Burma.279 UN Human Rights experts also jointly 
issued a 2006 statement about the “widespread violence” that had 
“continued to spiral” in townships of Karen State and Pegu Division.280 
The statement included concerns about the military’s alleged excessive 
use of force and fire arms and reports from various sources about very 
serious allegations of unlawful killings, torture, rape, and forced labor.281
 The 2008 report of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) underscored that 
high levels of attacked have continued throughout the period since 2002. 
The report expressed concerns about sexual violence in non-conflict 
zones.282 
277  Id. at ¶ 475. see also id. at ¶ 476 (“Ms. Pa Ong, a 40- year-old woman with mental 
disability, originally from Khur Nim village but who had been forcibly relocated to 
Maak Laang village was forcibly seized by SPDC troops from LIB515 in late 2003 
and was gangraped by the soldiers. She reportedly died four days later.”); id. at ¶ 477 
(“Ms. Naan Zum, a 18-year-old woman living in the suburban area of Murng-Su 
town [in Shan State] was forcibly taken away from her residence to a nearby forest on 
25 Apr. 2004 by about 15 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) soldiers. She 
was allegedly gang-raped and stabbed to death by the soldiers.”).
278  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30.
279  Id.
280  Press Release 2006, supra note 213.
281  Id.
282  U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW], 
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women: Myanmar, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/MMR/CO/3,     ¶ 22 (Nov. 7, 2008) 
(hereinafter CEDAW Committee 2008) (“[T]he Committee expresses concern at the 
high prevalence of violence against women and girls, such as widespread domestic 
violence and sexual violence, including rape. . . . The Committee is concerned that 
geographical areas of particular concern include the Northern [Arakan] State and 
those areas affected by Cyclone Nargis as well as other areas where women and girls 
are particularly vulnerable and marginalized.”).
56  Human Rights Violations in Burma
With regards to areas of armed conflict, the report singled out abuses in 
eastern Burma as well as ongoing concerns with impunity:
[The CEDAW Committee] expresses its deep concern 
at the high prevalence of sexual and other forms of 
violence, including rape, perpetrated by members of the 
armed forces against rural ethnic women, including, 
inter alia, the Shan, Mon, Karen, Palaung, and Chin. 
The Committee is also concerned at the apparent 
impunity of the perpetrators of such violence, although 
a few cases have been prosecuted, and at reports of 
threats, intimidation and punishment of the victims. 
The Committee regrets the lack of information on 
mechanisms and remedies available to victims of sexual 
violence as well as measures to bring perpetrators to 
justice.”283
 Overall, various UN sources have identified sexual violence in 
eastern Burma as an area of major concern, especially because reports are 
likely to be below the real numbers of abuses.  
2. Purpose and Method
 UN sources also outline military forces apparent purpose for 
perpetrating sexual violence throughout the focus period. The Torture 
Rapporteur, for example, stated the following:
Women and girls are subjected to violence by soldiers, 
especially sexual violence, as “punishment” for allegedly 
supporting ethnic armed groups. The authorities 
sanction violence against women and girls committed 
by military officers, including torture, inter alia, as a 
means of terrorizing and subjugating the population, 
particularly those in the Shan state.284
 The Myanmar Rapporteur stated specifically that all documented 
283  Id. at ¶ 24.
284  Torture Rapporteur 2006 , supra note 260, at 153.
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cases of rape received up until August 2003 had reportedly been 
committed by the Tatmadaw soldiers.285 The Myanmar Rapporteur 
noted that a number of cases had been reported in which a victim had 
been raped by more than one soldier.286 The Torture Rapporteur also 
reported that gang rape was a common practice.287 Further, the Myanmar 
Rapporteur described that in most of these cases, the victims had 
allegedly been captured by a group of Burmese soldiers while they were 
working alone on their farms.288 In some cases, they had been caught, for 
instance, while taking a bath; in others, women had been caught in their 
own village when the Tatmadaw troops had arrived and all the men had 
run away.289 In two separate documented cases, a young girl had been 
raped at an army base.290 In one case, a girl had been taken while she 
was doing forced labor and, in another, a young girl had been arrested 
together with twelve other villagers, all men, who had later been killed. 
291 The Executions Rapporteur also reported incidents in the context of 
other abuses, including forced displacement and killings.292
3. Culture of Impunity
 UN actors, particularly the Myanmar Rapporteur, have 
highlighted the culture of impunity around sexual violence perpetrated 
by the military as an area of serious concern.293 In one report, the 
Myanmar Rapporteur observed that a “noteworthy illustration of the 
consistent and continuing pattern of impunity is the high number of 
allegations of sexual violence against women and girls committed by 
members of the military.”294 He was also unaware of any initiatives by 
the Burmese government to look into such abuses in order to identify 
285  Myanmar Rapporteur 2003, supra note 268, at ¶ 58.
286  Id.
287  Torture Rapporteur 2006, supra note 260, at 153; see also Executions Rapporteur 
2006, supra note 274, at ¶ 477.




292  Executions Rapporteur 2006, supra note 274, at ¶¶  471, 475.
293  See, e.g., Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30; Myanmar Rapporteur 
2006 II, supra note 197, at ¶ 78-79.
294  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30.
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the perpetrators and bring them to justice.295 In relation to the 625 cases 
of alleged rapes committed prior to 2002, the Torture Rapporteur stated 
that reports alleged that 83% of the rapes were committed by officers, 
often in front of their troops; and 61% of the rape incidents involved gang 
rapes. 296 In only one of these cases was the perpetrator punished by his 
commanding officer.297
 In 2008, the CEDAW Committee observed:
The Committee is also concerned that such violence 
appears to be socially legitimized and accompanied by a 
culture of silence and impunity, that cases of violence are 
thus underreported and that those that are reported are 
settled out of court. It is also concerned at information 
that victims of sexual violence are forced, under the law, 
to report to the police immediately, prior to seeking 
health care, and as a consequence such victims choose to 
not seek health, psychological and legal support.298
 The Myanmar Rapporteur has routinely and strongly condemned 
the trend of impunity, stating for example in 2006 that “the failure 
to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for rape and 
sexual violence has contributed to an environment conducive to the 
perpetuation of violence against women and girls in Myanmar.”299 In 
2007, the Myanmar Rapporteur again stated that an illustration of the 
“consistent and continuing pattern of impunity” in Burma was the high 
number of allegations of sexual violence committed by the military that 
had been regularly documented since 2002.300 
 UN actors have also identified risks to those who make 
allegations, which further hinders accountability efforts. The Myanmar 
Rapporteur stated that it was “wholly unacceptable” that victims lodging 
complaints to the authorities find no avenue for address, but are instead 
295  Id.
296  Torture Rapporteur 2006, supra note 260, at 153.
297  Id.
298  CEDAW Committee 2008, supra note 282, at ¶ 22.
299  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30.
300  Myanmar Rapporteur 2007, supra note 188, at ¶ 41.
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at risk of reprisals.301 The Torture Rapporteur noted that those who do 
complain “are invariably instructed to accept meagre compensation 
under the threat that if they do not retract their complaint, they would be 
subjected to more violence.”302 He has also documented reports of specific 
instances where the Burmese military were actively preventing external 
actors from investigating rape cases.303 In October 2002, prior to the visit 
in Shan state of the Myanmar Rapporteur, the authorities threatened 
Shan villagers not to testify against their troops and sent out military 
intelligence officers to track down rape survivors.304 The same warnings 
were sent to the population prior to the visit of a delegation from the 
ICRC in southern Shan State in late 2002.305 Military officers threatened 
to cut the tongues and slit the throats of anyone who dared speak to the 
ICRC delegations about human rights abuses committed by the military 
troops.306 The population was similarly threatened when a delegation 
from Amnesty international visited Burma in January 2003.307
 The Burmese government’s response to the reported cases 
communicated to it by the Executions Rapporteur, outlined in the levels 
of sexual violence section above, also provides evidence of a culture of 
impunity.308 In its response, the government claimed that “thorough 
investigations had been carried out by the authorities.”309 The outcome of 
the investigation in all cases was that the person did not exist, the village 
did not exist, and/or the incident never happened. 310 In response, the 
Executions Rapporteur stated the following:
 The Special Rapporteur accepts that many of the victims 
and villages no longer exist. However, the SR deeply regrets that the 
Government of Myanmar finds this to be a reason to deny that the alleged 
incidents occurred, given that the allegations are precisely that the deaths 
of the victims and the destruction of their villages were perpetrated by 
Government forces. The SR hopes that the Government will conduct good 
301  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 II, supra note 197, at ¶ 79.
302  Torture Rapporteur 2006, supra note 260, at 154.
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faith investigations into future allegations.311
 This suggests that the Special Rapporteur did not consider the 
response or investigations of the Burmese government to be sufficient. In 
light of this culture of impunity, the Myanmar Rapporteur also offered 
his services to the junta to undertake an independent investigation. 
In October 2004, he received information that the government was 
preparing to dispatch teams to investigate each alleged case. The 
Myanmar Rapporteur publicly stated his willingness to carry out an 
independent assessment and drew specific attention to the fact that he 
had made a similar offer to the Burmese authorities with respect to the 
allegations of sexual violence against Shan women, which the authorities 
failed to take up.312 In later reports, the Myanmar Rapporteur repeatedly 
drew attention to the failure of the Burmese regime to accept his offer of 
an independent assessment.313
4. UN Actors’ Conclusions and Recommendations 
Regarding Sexual Violence
 The Myanmar Rapporteur described the trend of sexual violence 
as “particularly alarming” because the figures he provided were likely to 
be “far lower than the reality”.314 Many women do not report incidents 
of trauma, and the Myanmar Rapporteur also had limited access to 
areas where violence was reported to be occurring.315 However, even in 
spite of this concern over low levels of reporting, the UN actors have 
described the levels of sexual violence as widespread and prevalent.316 The 
Myanmar Rapporteur has specifically stated that he has received reports 
311  Id. at 149.
312  The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of 
human rights in Myanmar, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms in Any Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar: 
Report of the Special Rapporteur, delivered to the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECO-
SOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/36, ¶ 42 (Dec. 2, 2004) 
(hereinafter Myanmar Rapporteur 2004).
313  See, e.g., id.
314  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3,  at ¶ 30; Torture Rapporteur 2006, 
supra note 260, at 153-55.
315  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30
316  See CEDAW Committee 2008, supra note 282, at ¶¶ 22, 24; Myanmar Rapporteur 
2008, supra note 218, at ¶¶ 55, 58.
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of “widespread and systematic” abuse, which included sexual violence.317 
Finally, in light of the recognition of a persistent culture of impunity, 
many UN actors have also called for the prompt, independent, and 
thorough investigation of these alleged violations.318
5. Analysis of Sexual Violence
 An analysis of the UN documents that report on sexual violence 
in eastern Burma establishes a prima facie case of the existence of these 
abuses and should lead the UN Security Council to mandate the creation 
of a Commission of Inquiry mandated to further investigate the nature 
and extent of the violations. The UN has available evidence from its 
own actors that strongly suggests that the military forces perpetration 
of prohibited acts of sexual violence and rape in Burma constitute either 
crimes against humanity prohibited by Article 7(1)(g) or war crimes 
prohibited by Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute. Indeed, UN actors 
describe violations that include the essential legal elements of both 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. Finally, the UN documents 
have particularly emphasized the lack of accountability in this context, 
further justifying UN action and investigation. 
Common Elements
 Firstly, crimes against humanity require that there is an “attack” 
which is “directed against a civilian population”. There is no suggestion 
that any of the reported victims were anything other than civilians. The 
second requirement is that the prohibited acts are either widespread or 
systematic and involve an attack on a civilian population. The CEDAW 
Committee has described the levels of sexual violence as “widespread”,319 
and the Myanmar Rapporteur has identified a “widespread and 
systematic” pattern.320 The “widespread” nature of the abuse is reflected 
in the scale of the violations documented by the various UN actors. 
Furthermore, the reported figures are anticipated to be “far lower 
317  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 58.
318  See, e.g., Executions Rapporteur 2007, supra note 208, at 223.
319  See CEDAW Committee 2008, supra note 282, at ¶¶ 22, 24.
320  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 58.
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than the reality”.321 In addition, the description of the purpose of such 
reported violence as a “punishment” and “as a means of terrorizing and 
subjugating the population, particularly those in the Shan state” suggests 
the “systematic” use of sexual violence in eastern Burma. Finally, the 
high levels of reporting strongly suggest that there have been multiple 
commissions of such prohibited acts resulting from armed force, or 
which at the very least amount to the mistreatment of the civilian 
population. 
 In terms of the common elements of war crimes the UN 
documents clearly suggest that there is an internal armed conflict 
and that it goes beyond the level of a disturbance or riot. The reports 
documented by the UN repeatedly attribute violations to members of the 
Burmese military. In some situations this is because the crime was known 
to have been committed at an army base, or because it was directly 
reported as committed by soldiers, whose names, ranks, and units were 
sometimes identified.322 Moreover, the UN documents describe military 
members perpetrating sexual violence as a “punishment” for allegedly 
supporting ethnic nationality armed groups, and as a part of actions 
used to terrorize or subjugate the population.323 These references and the 
consistent identification in the reports of Burmese military members 
as the violators clearly implies that some such acts may have taken 
place within the nexus of an armed conflict. In particular, the distinct 
conclusions drawn by the CEDAW Committee regarding sexual violence 
in armed conflict areas and non-conflict areas firmly suggests that such 
violations have occurred with a sufficient nexus to the armed conflict.324 
 As noted, under the Rome Statute the jurisdictional requirement 
of war crimes is that they must arise in situations where prohibited acts 
(such as rape) are committed as part of a “plan” or “policy” or there 
is a “large-scale commission” of the crime. As with the crimes against 
humanity analysis, the high levels of reported violations and the use of 
such acts as a means to suppress the ethnic minority population meets 
this jurisdictional threshold. 
321  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 30; Torture Rapporteur 2006, 
supra note 260, at 153-155.
322  Myanmar Rapporteur 2003, supra note 268, at ¶¶ 58-59.
323  Torture Rapporteur 2006, supra note 260, at 153.
324  CEDAW Committee 2008, supra note 282, at ¶¶ 22, 24.
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Elements of the Prohibited Act: Consent
 One of the key elements regarding both the crimes of sexual 
violence and rape is whether or not there was consent to the specific act. 
The UN reports refer to incidents of rape, itself a prohibited act, as well 
as gang rape and forced marriage (carrying with it the highly possible 
consequence of a forceful sexual encounter that may amount to acts of 
enforced prostitution or sexual slavery). Attaching terms such as rape 
suggests that consent was not present though an additional investigation 
is required to establish whether or not it was present in fact. 
Impunity
 Additionally, the UN documents emphasize the culture of 
impunity surrounding the reported sexual violence by the military. See 
above section Culture of Impunity. This impunity has made sexual violence 
acceptable, and UN actors have specifically criticized the government for 
its failure to investigate and prosecute those responsible. In short, the UN 
documentation of reported sexual violence creates a prima facie case for 
further investigation into whether they in fact constitute international 
crimes.
C. Extrajudicial Killings and Torture
 As with forced displacement and sexual violence, the UN 
documentation of extrajudicial killings and torture creates a prima facie 
case that justifies a thorough UN investigation into such violations. UN 
actors have described the reported violations, predominantly committed 
by the military forces, as severe and long-term in nature and as part of 
an effort to control the civilian population in ethnic nationality areas 
since 2002. Of particular concern is that the reports note a significantly 
deteriorating situation regarding the level of such incidents. The UN 
actors also document that the reported violations are perpetrated within a 
culture of impunity. In conclusion, the analysis of the UN documentation 
strongly suggests that the reported violations of extrajudicial killings and 
torture constitute international crimes. 
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1. Levels of Violence
 UN actors and institutions have long documented extrajudicial 
killings and torture in Burma: for example, the Myanmar Rapporteur, 
General Assembly, and Commission on Human Rights have noted 
the occurrence of such violations in Burma consistently since 1992. 
See Charts A, B, and C. The Myanmar Rapporteur has documented a 
large number of extrajudicial killings by the military forces in 2002.325 
The majority of victims were reportedly IDPs who were shot after 
being discovered by Tatmadaw soldiers.326 The Myanmar Rapporteur 
documented reports of egregious cases involving groups of individuals 
stated to have taken place in the Shan and Karen States.327 The reports 
also included cases of torture and arbitrary detention that appeared to 
indicate that the military has used these practices as a warning to others 
to follow orders.328 In most reported cases, the torture victims were 
accused of being supporters of armed elements of ethnic nationality 
groups.329 The Myanmar Rapporteur reported an example in May 2002 
provided by a 50-year-old Karen man from the Kawkareik Township 
in Karen State.330 The man reported that four Karen villagers had been 
accused of being KNU soldiers. 331 Villagers were called to see how the 
four men had been tied up and tortured (hit on their heads, even when 
they were bleeding and suffocated with a plastic sheet) at a place outside 
the village.332 Following seven days of such treatment the four men had 
been taken to a military camp and were not seen afterwards. The witness 
presumed that they had been executed.333
 In 2002, the Executions Rapporteur also sent letters to the 
Burmese authorities about cases where there had been an excessive use 
of force, under the guise of dealing with “terrorists,” against farmers 
and others who brought up social or economic issues.334 The Executions 
325  Myanmar Rapporteur 2003, supra note 268, at ¶ 57.
326  Id.
327  Id.
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Rapporteur also intervened in 2003 with regard to summary execution 
cases committed by the military that involved ordinary peasants, 
including women and children, who were accused of supporting Shan 
soldiers.335 The reports described scenes in which government soldiers 
summarily executed or tortured civilians, and gang raped women before 
shooting and killing them.336 The Executions Rapporteur transmitted 
allegations to the government dealing with the period 2003 and 2004, 
including the following:
Naang Seng and Naang Long, two 17-year-old girls from 
Saai Murng quarter in Ta-Khi-Laek town [in Shan State], 
were stopped by a group of three SPDC troops near Ta-
Khi-Laek town on 22 August 2003. They were severely 
kicked and beaten by the troops. The two girls were later 
found unconscious by some villagers and taken to a 
hospital. Naang Seng died that same night. A complaint 
was lodged with the SPDC authorities at Ta-Khi-Laek 
township officer. As far as the Special Rapporteurs have 
been informed, no action has been taken to investigate 
the case.337
Saang Zi-Na, a 45-year-old villager from Pang Sa, was 
shot dead by a patrol of SPDC troops from the 55th 
Division near Paang Sa village, Loi La village tract, Nam-
Zarng township [in Shan State], on 23 August 2003, 
when he was fetching water on the bank of Nam Taeng 
river. On 26 August 2003, a column of the same SPDC 
and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearances and Summary Execu-
tions: Extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions:
Report of the Special Rapporteur, delivered to the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECO-
SOC], Comm’n on Human Rights pursuant to Resolution 2002/36, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2003/3, ¶ 32 (Jan. 13, 2003) (hereinafter Executions Rapporteur 2003 I). 
335  The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Civil 
and Political Rights, Including the Question of Disappearances and Summary Execu-
tions: Extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions:
Report of the Special Rapporteur, delivered to the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECO-
SOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/7, ¶ 41 (Dec. 22, 2003) 
(hereinafter Executions Rapporteur 2003 II).
336  Id.
337  Executions Rapporteur 2006, supra note 274, at ¶ 472.
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troops arrested Naang Non, his pregnant wife, in Paang 
Sa village and took her to Ta Zao Murng, a Nam Taeng 
river harbour. Another woman, Naang Zaam, found 
on their way, was taken with them. Once there, the two 
women were interrogated about boats in the area and 
severely beaten with bamboo sticks. They were also 
threatened with death. They were later released. As a 
result of the beatings, Naang Non suffered from internal 
injuries and had a miscarriage.338
 In 2005, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples sent another 
communication of a specific allegation to the Burmese government, 
which described:
[A]n alleged raid by government soldiers on the village 
of Tagu Seik, Einme . . . had resulted in the death of 
one person. According to the information received, the 
army surrounded Tagu Seik on 7 July 2005, searching 
and ransacking the village on suspicion that the villagers 
had contacts with the Karen National Union (an armed 
opposition group) and were hiding weapons and 
explosives, though none were found. According to the 
source, an indigenous local schoolteacher called Stanford 
died during interrogation as a result of being tortured, 
including with electric shocks.339 
 These specific allegations fit within the context of a pattern of 
violations identified by other UN actors. Regarding the period between 
2005 and 2006, the Myanmar Rapporteur stated that “[v]iolence against 
338  Id. at ¶ 473.
339  Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people, Indigenous Issues: Human rights and indigenous issues: Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of indigenous people: Addendum: Analysis of country situations and other activities 
of the Special Rapporteur, delivered to the U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], 
Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/78/Add.1, ¶ 60 (Jan. 18, 2006) 
(hereinafter Indigenous Peoples Rapporteur 2006).
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unarmed civilians by the Myanmar military is a very serious concern.”340 
Additionally, he had received reports from “reliable and independent 
sources” alleging the militarization of refugee camps at the border that 
also put at risk the safety of civilians.341 UN Human Rights experts also 
jointly issued a press release in 2006 that raised deep concern about the 
“widespread violence” that had “continued to spiral” in the previous six 
months in the Thandaung and Papun townships of Karen State as well 
as Kyaukgyi and Shwegyin townships of Pegu Division.342 The military 
allegedly acted with excessive use of force and fire arms. Reports from 
various sources corroborated very serious allegations of unlawful killings, 
torture, rape, and forced labor.343
 The Executions Rapporteur again wrote to the Burmese 
authorities with concerns about abuses in 2005 and 2006 and specifically 
raised concern over “the recent escalation in violence in counter-
insurgency operations against the Karen National Union (KNU)—an 
armed ethnic minority opposition group.”344 The operation was viewed 
to be affecting “ethnic minority villagers in northern Kayin (Karen) 
state and in the east of an area known as [Pegu] Division, in eastern 
Myanmar.”345 Reports indicated that “several civilians, including women 
and children may have been extra-judicially killed.”346 The army also 
reportedly tortured individuals as part of the operation.347 
 The Myanmar Rapporteur also raised concern about the situation 
in Karen State following military offenses there in 2006 to 2007, which 
resulted in a number of extrajudicial killings and other attacks on 
civilians by the Burmese military.348 The widespread violence reportedly 
increased in 2007 in certain areas, and reliable observers considered it the 
worst humanitarian situation since the 1996-1997 military campaign.349 
340  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 48; Myanmar Rapporteur 2007, 
supra note 188, at ¶ 58.
341  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 47; Myanmar Rapporteur 2007, 
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The Myanmar Rapporteur also expressed concerns on various occasions 
over the “use of excessive force in the country linked to the alleged 
participation of groups, such as the Swan Ah Shin and other militias in 
violent attacks against civilians.”350 In sum, UN actors have chronicled 
extrajudicial killings and torture in eastern Burma annually during the 
entire period since 2002. 
2. Purpose and Policy
 In 2006, the Myanmar Rapporteur reported that it was often a 
“deliberate strategy” in the military campaigns in ethnic nationality areas 
to carry out acts of violence such as killing and terrorizing civilians.351 Of 
particular relevance to extrajudicial killings, the Executions Rapporteur 
and the Myanmar Rapporteur have both drawn attention to a “shoot on 
sight” policy often linked to the forced displacement of civilians.352 
3. Culture of Impunity
 The UN actors that reported extrajudicial killings and torture 
by the military forces in eastern Burma commonly understood the 
abuses to occur with impunity. In 2003, for example, the Executions 
Rapporteur specifically included Burma in a list of countries where the 
“military and special forces, in particular, are reported to use excessive 
force with impunity.”353 In 2008, the Myanmar Rapporteur noted that 
violations, including extrajudicial killings and torture, have not been 
investigated and those responsible have not been prosecuted.354 The 
result of this culture of impunity was that “victims have not been in a 
position to assert their rights and receive a fair and effective remedy.”355 
Referring to his previous reports that also noted the widespread and 
systematic nature of these serious human rights violations, the Myanmar 
Rapporteur concluded in 2008 that this suggested that such acts have 
not been isolated examples of individual misconduct by middle- or low-
350  See, e.g., id, at ¶ 61.
351  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3 at ¶ 47.  .
352  Executions Rapporteur 2007, supra note 208, at 222; Myanmar Rapporteur 2002, 
supra note 230, at ¶ 17.
353  Executions Rapporteur 2003 I, supra note 334, at ¶ 32. 
354  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 58.
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Crimes in Burma  69
ranking officers.356 Rather the violations were the result of a system in 
which individuals and groups may break the law without being called to 
account.357 
 As discussed in the sexual violence section, the Executions 
Rapporteur transmitted reported cases of violations, included killings, 
occurring in 2003 and 2004 to the government.358 He deemed the 
authorities’ response inadequate.359 In response, the Executions 
Rapporteur viewed the government’s reasons for lack of evidence as 
flawed, and expressed his hope that any future allegation would be 
investigated in “good faith.” 360 This interaction between the government 
and the UN supports the conclusion of a continuing pattern of immunity 
for grave IHL violations, including extrajudicial killings and torture.
 The culture of impunity has persisted throughout the period 
under analysis. In his 2006 letter involving specific reports of violations 
in eastern Burma, the Executions Rapporteur again appealed to the 
government to ensure that all deaths that occurred in connection with 
military operations were promptly, independently, and thoroughly 
investigated in accordance with the United Nations Principles on the 
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions.361 The Special Rapporteur requested the following 
information:
1. Are the facts reproduced in the above summary of the 
case accurate?
2. Please provide the details, and where available the 
results, of any investigation, medical examinations, and 
judicial or other inquiries carried out in relation to the 
killings occurred the in northern and eastern Myanmar.
3. Assuming that those responsible for the shootings 
have been or will be identified, please provide the full 
details of any prosecutions which have been undertaken, 
and of any other penal, disciplinary or administrative 
356  Id. at ¶ 59.
357  Id.
358  See supra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
359  Executions Rapporteur 2006, supra note 274, at 149, Myanmar Rapporteur 2002, 
supra note 230, at ¶ 17.
360  Executions Rapporteur 2006, supra note 274, at 149.
361  Executions Rapporteur 2007, supra note 208, at 223.
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sanctions imposed in this connection.
4. Please indicate whether compensation has been 
provided to the families of the victims.362
 The Executions Rapporteur also noted in the letter that the 
Burmese government had “failed to cooperate” with his UN mandate.363 
This refusal to cooperate again reinforces that impunity has been an 
ongoing and persistent problem with regards to extrajudicial killings and 
torture in Burma.
4. UN Actors’ Conclusions and Recommendations 
Regarding Extrajudicial Killings and Torture
 The killing and terrorizing of civilians has been identified as 
often being part of a “deliberate strategy” engaged in by the military in 
ethnic nationality areas.364 In 2008, the Myanmar Rapporteur included 
torture and summary executions in a list of reported violations described 
to be taking place on a “widespread and systematic basis.”365 The 
conclusion that impunity has attached to the perpetration of such actions 
has also led to various UN actors to call on the government to investigate, 
punish, and prosecute those responsible for the reported violations.366 For 
example, the Myanmar Rapporteur urged the authorities to provide full 
details of alleged crimes and to press for the cessation of hostilities by all 
parties during 2006 and 2007 military operations in eastern Burma.367  
 In 2006, the Executions Rapporteur made more specific 
recommendations after reminding the Burmese authorities that “shoot-
on-sight policies” are a “deep and enduring threat to human rights-
based law enforcement approaches.”368 He urged the regime to instruct 
its security forces to immediately prohibit any such policy and comply 
with the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
362  Id.
363  Id. at 222.
364  See, e.g., Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶.47; Myanmar Rapporteur 
2007, supra note 188, at ¶ 56.
365  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 58.
366  See, e.g., Executions Rapporteur 2007, supra note 208, at 224; Indigenous Peoples 
Rapporteur 2006, supra note 339, at ¶ 60. 
367  See, e.g., Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 80.
368  Executions Rapporteur 2007, supra note 208, at 223.
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Enforcement Officials.369 The obligations highlighted were that the 
law enforcement officials should “as far as possible apply non-violent 
means before resorting to the use of force and firearms” and that “in any 
event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly 
unavoidable in order to protect life.”370 Attention was also drawn in the 
letter to the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by 
the UN General Assembly in 1979, which more succinctly stresses the 
limited role for lethal force in all enforcement operations.371 
5. Analysis of Extrajudicial Killings and Torture
 The analysis of the UN documents that include reports of 
extrajudicial killings and torture in eastern Burma presents a prima facie 
case that such violations have occurred and must be further investigated. 
The evidence available to the UN from its own actors strongly suggests that 
the perpetration of prohibited acts of extrajudicial killings and torture in 
eastern Burma may constitute either crimes against humanity prohibited 
by Article 7(1)(f) or war crimes prohibited by Article 8(2)(c)(i) of the 
Rome Statute. Along with a lack of accountability for such violations in 
Burma, the legal elements of crimes against humanity and was crimes as 
set out in international criminal law are present to justify the creation of 
a Commission of Inquiry to thoroughly investigate the scope and scale of 
violations.
Common Elements
 The UN documentation strongly suggests that the reported 
extrajudicial killings and use of torture in eastern Burma are part of 
“an attack directed against a civilian population”, a critical element of 
establishing a crime against humanity. As discussed there have been 
numerous reports of multiple commissions of the prohibited acts of 
torture and extrajudicial killings as a consequence of the use of armed 
force. Moreover, the UN documents consistently refer to the victims 
as civilians. A particular example is the statement by the Myanmar 
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military is a very serious concern.”372 
 Establishing a crime against humanity also requires that attacks 
are “widespread or systematic.” The Myanmar Rapporteur has described 
killings and torture as both “widespread and systematic.”373 The annual 
reports chronicled demonstrate the scale of violence and the persistent 
and “widespread” nature of the abuses. Furthermore, UN actors 
have exhibited particular concern during certain periods about what 
they described as an “escalation” in violence and also where violence 
“continued to spiral.”374 “Systematic” violations involve policy: in regards 
to Burma, UN actors have described the Four Cuts Policy as a means of 
terrorizing the population. In particular, regarding extrajudicial killings 
there has been concern about the “shoot-on-sight policy” which exists in 
parts of eastern Burma.375 The evidence available meets the threshold for 
establishing a prima facie case that crimes against humanity have been 
taking place in Burma.
 The UN documents also strongly suggest the existence of the 
common elements of war crimes: there is a situation of internal armed 
conflict in eastern Burma, and the reported acts may have the required 
nexus to an armed conflict. References to ethnic nationality armed 
groups and the constant identification in the UN reports of Burmese 
military members as perpetrators of such violence indicate that IHL 
should apply to the situation. Moreover, the persistent reference to the 
victims as civilians suggests that they are non-combatants, mandating 
certain IHL protections. 
 The special jurisdiction requirement for war crimes under the 
Rome Statute that extrajudicial killings and torture are part of a “plan” 
or “policy” or are committed on a “large-scale” is also present on its face. 
The above analysis in relation to crimes against humanity again informs 
the case here. The scale of reported violations and the use of such acts as 
a means to suppress the ethnic minority population may meet the criteria 
of a “plan” or the acts being “large-scale.” Again, the use of the language 
of “widespread and systematic” suggests this conclusion, particularly as 
these requirements for war crimes are less demanding than those of the 
crimes against humanity’s elements of “widespread or systematic.” 
372  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶ 48; Myanmar Rapporteur 2007, 
supra note 188, at ¶ 58.
373  Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 58.
374  Press Release 2006, supra note 213.
375  Executions Rapporteur 2007, supra note 208, at 223.
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Elements of the Prohibited Act: Unlawfulness and the Intention to Inflict 
Severe Pain
 Extrajudicial killings constitute international crimes when they 
are unlawful, meaning that they are not committed in accordance with 
fair trial and sentencing standards. The key element for torture is the 
infliction of severe pain against a person. The UN documents in no way 
suggest that the killings at issue occur with any procedural safeguards, 
as exemplified by the use of terms such as “extrajudicial killing” or 
“summary execution” and the existence of “shoot-on-site” policies. The 
torturous acts as described would clearly inflict severe pain. Further, 
the reports documented by the UN do not describe pain and suffering 
inherent or accidental resulting from a lawful sanction. A case by case 
determination would ultimately establish if these elements were present, 
but the UN documents strongly suggest that these elements of the 
individual prohibited acts do exist in order to establish a prima facie case 
that such crimes may have been committed. 
Impunity
 Finally, the UN documents emphasize the culture of impunity 
surrounding the violence—including the military’s failure to investigate 
and prosecute the responsible parties. See above section on Culture of 
Impunity. Together, this analysis of extrajudicial killings and torture in 
the UN documentation establishes a prima facie case for the existence of 
such violations amounting to possible crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.
D. Legal Evaluation
 The analysis of each of the individual violations focused on in 
this report, forced displacement, sexual violence, extrajudicial killings 
and torture result in the conclusion that each separately creates a prima 
facie case for the existence of violations amounting to possible crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. These separate findings should 
mandate the UN Security Council to constitute a Commission of Inquiry 
into the extent and nature of each of these violations. However, these 
individualized findings regarding each category of violation also point 
to a broader pattern of violence. This is supported by the Myanmar 
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Rapporteur’s generalized statements about violence in ethnic nationality 
areas, such as “the killing, terrorizing or displacement of civilians is often 
part of a deliberate strategy”, and “violence against unarmed civilians by 
the Myanmar military is a very serious concern.”376 
 For the international community to act, it must also be 
established that the government has failed to provide accountability 
for reported violations that have occurred within its borders.377 As set 
out in the legal framework section, ICC jurisdiction in particular is not 
designed to supplant the national jurisdiction. Rather it is designed to 
supplement it in accordance with the principle of complementarity. The 
UN actors have strongly criticized the military regime on this front and 
emphasized the culture of impunity surrounding the violations examined 
in this report.378 For example, the Myanmar Rapporteur has made 
numerous declarations about impunity surrounding sexual violence379 
as well as extrajudicial killings and torture.380 Moreover, none of the 
UN actors suggest that there has been accountability for the reported 
violations of forced displacement. The violations are also interrelated: the 
reported forced displacements, for example, are linked to the “shoot-on-
sight” policy that occurs within what is described as the overall “culture 
of impunity.”381 Furthermore, in the Myanmar Rapporteur’s assessment, 
the entrenched impunity “cannot be attributed to lack of institutional 
capacity alone,” given that often the violations, in spite of being known by 
the authorities, are not acted upon.382 
 The Myanmar Rapporteur has also stated that “the continued 
misuse of the legal system . . . denies the rule of law and represents 
a major obstacle to securing the effective and meaningful exercise 
of fundamental freedoms.”383 Further, he noted with regret that the 
“lack of independence of the judiciary has provided a ‘legal’ basis 
for abuses of power, arbitrary decision-making and the examination 
of those responsible for serious human rights violations.”384 The UN 
376  Myanmar Rapporteur 2006 I, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 47-48.
377  See supra Part II International Criminal Law Framework
378  See supra Part III Human Rights Violations in Eastern Burma.
379  See, e.g., Myanmar Rapporteur 2008 I, supra note 218, at ¶ 87.
380  Id. at ¶ 58.
381  Id. 
382  Id. at ¶ 42.
383  Id. at ¶ 62.
384  Id.
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General Assembly385 and the Human Rights Council386 have also issued 
recommendations to the military regime to initiate investigations and 
carry out fair trials in order to end the prevailing impunity. These 
recommendations and calls for the end of impunity have been consistent 
and repeated, the latest example being made in the General Assembly’s 
2009 resolution.387 This cumulative evidence on impunity is substantial 
and unambiguous, and plainly justifies international action in this arena. 
 In conclusion, all of the necessary elements exist for the UN 
to act. Its own actors are aware of the reported violations and their 
documentation and description of them strongly suggests that they 
constitute international crimes. Its own actors have also found impunity. 
Thus, the analysis highlights the need for a UN Security Council 
mandated Commission of Inquiry into the situation in Burma, which 
would investigate both the reported violations as well as the documented 
failure of the military regime to provide accountability and justice. 
 Finally, while this section has focused on eastern Burma and 
four specific violations, any Commission should not limit its analysis to 
this region or these particular abuses. See generally Charts A, B, and C 
(tracing UN condemnation of violations since the 1990s). References 
to ceasefire and ethnic nationalities areas in UN documents are not 
restricted to eastern Burma alone. Thus, they must also be understood 
as raising concern of violations in other such areas. Moreover, though 
the civilian populations in ethnic nationality areas are reported to be 
particularly vulnerable, they are not the sole victims and abuses are 
reported elsewhere. Similarly, the findings made with reference to the 
specific violations—forced displacement, sexual violence, extrajudicial 
killings and torture—should not prevent the Commission of Inquiry 
from investigating the broader list of violations reported by the UN actors 
across Burma. Indeed, any Commission should investigate all possible 
international crimes as established in the Rome Statute.
385  General Assembly Resolution. 61/232, supra note 182; Situation of human rights in 
Myanmar, G.A. Res. 62/222, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/222 (Feb. 28, 2008).
386  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, Hum. Rts. Coun.Res. S-5/1, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/RES/S-5/1 (Oct. 2, 2007); Follow-up to the report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Hum. Rts. Coun.
Res. 6/33, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/6/33 (Dec. 14, 2007).
387  Situation of human rights in Myanmar, G.A. Res. 63/245, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/245 
(Jan. 23, 2009).  
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iv.  Precedents for Action
 The situation in eastern Burma, as documented by the UN, 
represents a grave human rights crisis taking place in a culture of 
impunity. The UN Security Council, however, has not taken concerted 
action to deal with the crisis. The Security Council has in the past 
responded to other crises after determining that they constitute a 
“threat to the peace”.388 Specific examples of a response by the Security 
Council following such a determination have been the creation of ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals to prosecute grave violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law regarding atrocities in 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Another example is the referral of 
Darfur to the ICC. The violations that have been reported in Burma are 
also sufficiently long-lasting and severe to merit similar Security Council 
action.  
 This section looks at three past instances—the former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Darfur—in which the Security Council has used its Chapter 
VII powers to act. In each of these three situations, the Security Council 
took the same general approach: (1) the United Nations took note of 
the violations occurring, condemned them through resolutions and 
recognized that the situation constituted at “threat to the peace”, then 
(2) the Security Council established a Commission of Inquiry to look 
further into and verify the violations, and finally (3) the Security Council 
established an international judicial mechanism, or made an ICC referral, 
to address the violations. 
 That the Security Council chose to take this sort of action 
signals an acknowledgement of the strengthening international norms 
supporting action by the international community in response to gross 
human rights and IHL violations. This section compares these situations 
to that in Burma in order to show that many violations that the UN has 
acknowledged as occurring in Burma have in the past been the cause for 
Security Council action. The section also shows that while the Security 
Council has acknowledged these violations in Burma, it has not yet gone 
further and taken the next step in its established process to address grave 
violations, the creation of a Commission of Inquiry. 
388  U.N. Charter, at art. 39.
A. The Security Council’s Chapter VII Powers
 The UN Security Council has the power under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter to take measures “to maintain or restore international 
peace and security” when it determines “the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”389 Article 41 of the 
Charter allows the Security Council to take action that does not involve 
the use of force.390 As articulated in Article 33 of the Charter, whenever 
the Council “deems necessary,” at “any stage” of a dispute, it may 
intervene “to ensure prompt and effective action” to safeguard peace and 
security.391 Although the Charter does not definitively limit the Security 
Council’s powers, until recently it was largely viewed that Chapter VII 
action would occur only in response to situations that had international 
ramifications, such as conflicts that had spillover effects beyond their 
borders.392
 Prior to the 1990s, the Security Council rarely used its Chapter 
VII powers due to Cold War tensions.393 It first used the power in 1965 
to condemn the declaration of independence and minority rule by 
the “racist minority” of southern Rhodesia.394 This eventually led to a 
sanctions regime.395 The Security Council again acted in 1977 to impose 
sanctions on the apartheid regime of South Africa.396
 With the end of the Cold War, the Security Council began to use 
its Chapter VII powers more frequently. For example, in 1991, Security 
Council Resolution 688 regarding the situation of the Kurds in Iraq stated 
that “repression of the Iraqi civilian population . . . threaten international 
peace and security in the region.”397 Additionally, Security Council 
389  Id.
390  Id. at art. 41. Article 42 also allows the Security Council to take further action that 
includes the use of force. U.N. Charter, art. 42.
391  Id. at art. 33.
392  Christopher J. Le Mon & Rachel S. Taylor, Security Council Action in the Name 
of Human Rights: From Rhodesia to the Congo, 10 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Poly 197, 
209 (2004) (hereinafter Security Council Action).
393  Id. 
394  S.C. Res. 216, U.N. Doc. S/RES/216 (Nov. 12, 1965); S.C. Res 217, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965). 
395  S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
396  S.C. Res. 418, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (Nov.  4, 1977). 
397  S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
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members began increasingly to suggest that human rights violations, 
even without international spillover effects, could prompt Chapter 
VII action.398 For example, in Resolution 794 the Security Council 
unanimously authorized the use of force “to restore peace, stability, and 
law and order” in Somalia.”399 The resolution stated that, “the magnitude 
of the human rights tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further 
exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.”400 The resolution’s text made no mention of trans-border effects 
and the delegates present at the meeting framed the problem in Somalia 
almost exclusively as a humanitarian, or human rights one.401
 The Security Council has taken action regarding Sierra Leone, 
Afghanistan, Haiti, Yemen, Liberia, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
and Sudan, among others.402 The Security Council acted in each of 
these situations, relying on Chapter VII, once it had determined that 
the situations in each of these countries constituted a “threat to the 
peace” that required intervention to protect and preserve international 
stability.403 To date, there is no precise definition of what constitutes 
a “threat to the peace” as the Security Council has responded to 
the totality of the situation that arose in each set of circumstances. 
However, according to the report Threat to the Peace, the Security 
Council has in the past taken into account the following factors to 
determine the existence of a “threat to the peace”: (1) the overthrow of 
a democratically-elected government; (2) conflict among governmental 
bodies and insurgent armies or armed ethnic groups; (3) widespread 
internal humanitarian/human rights violations; (4) substantial outflow 
of refugees; and (5) other cross-border problems (for instance, drug 
trafficking).404 
 In the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur, which this report 
398  Security Council Action, supra note 392, at 214. 
399  S.C. Res.794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794, preamble, ¶ 14, (Dec. 3, 1992).
400  Id. at preamble, ¶3.
401  Security Council Action, supra note 392, at 216-17 (citing U.N. Doc s/PV.3145 
(1992)).
402  DLA Piper, Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Bur-
ma, September 20, 2005, available at  http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/reports/
Burmaunscreport.pdf (hereinafter Threat to the Peace). 
403  Id. (Executive Summary). 
404  Id.
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examines, the Security Council took measures in order to combat grave 
IHL violations. Upon recognizing that grave violations were occurring 
and continued to occur, and after passing resolutions condemning these 
violations and calling upon the parties involved to stop the violence, 
the Security Council created a Commission of Inquiry.405 The purpose 
of the Commission was to analyze the conflict and conduct fact-finding 
missions to determine and verify the probable extent of the violations. 
Upon completion of a Commission of Inquiry report, the Council 
determined what further action was necessary; in these three cases, 
the Council decided that international justice mechanisms were an 
appropriate tool.406 
B. The Former Yugoslavia
 In 1992, the Security Council responded to reports of IHL 
violations in the former Yugoslavia, specifically reports of “mass forcible 
expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment, and abuse of 
civilians in detention centres, deliberate attacks on non-combatants, 
hospitals and ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical 
supplies to the civilian population, and wanton devastation and 
destruction of property.”407 In Resolution 771, The Security Council 
acted under Chapter VII to demand that “all military forces in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, immediately desist from all breaches of international 
humanitarian law” and that international humanitarian organizations 
“be granted immediate, unimpeded and continued access to camps, 
prisons and detention centres within the territory.”408 The Security 
Council also requested that states and humanitarian organizations 
“collate substantiated information . . . relating to the violations of 
humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 
being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and to make 
405  With regard to the Yugoslavia and Rwanda conflicts, the body was called a Com-
mission of Experts. With regard to the Darfur conflict, the body was called a Com-
mission of Inquiry. The mandates of these Commissions were largely equivalent. 
406  S.C. Res. 837, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY); S.C. 
Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR); S.C. Res. 1593, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC). 
407  S.C. Res. 771, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (Aug. 13, 1992).
408  Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. 
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this information available to the Council.”409 Because at the point when 
the former Yugoslav republics declared independence and subsequently 
became members of the UN, the conflict became international, the 
actions taken by the Security Council regarding the former Yugoslavia 
were within the Council’s usual assumption that actions they take must 
relate to an issue of an international character.410
 The Security Council soon determined that further action was 
necessary, and with Resolution 780 established a Commission of Experts 
to investigate and gather evidence of “grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law” 
in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.411 The Council made special 
note of reports of “mass killings and the continuance of the practice 
of ‘ethnic cleansing.’”412 The Commission conducted 32 missions, and 
focused on in-depth investigations of mass killing and destruction of 
property, treatment of prisoners and detainees, systematic sexual assaults, 
and “ethnic cleansing.”413 After these investigations, the Commission 
reported to the Security Council its findings of “significant evidence of 
and information about the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law,” 
including practices of “ethnic cleansing,” sexual assault, and rape “carried 
out by some of the parties so systematically that they strongly appear 
to be the product of a policy.”414 In addition, the Commission found 
evidence of murder, torture, attacking and targeting civilians, detention 
and deprivation of liberty, and destruction of cultural property, among 
other crimes.415 In response to the Commission of Experts’ Report, 
the Security Council subsequently created the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with Resolution 827.416
409  Id. at ¶ 5. 
410  Letter Dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council, Annex:
Final Report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Coun-
cil Resolution 780, (1992) ¶ 306  U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) (hereinafter 
Commission of Experts Resolution 780 Report). 
411  S.C. Res. 780, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780, ¶ 2 (Oct. 6, 1992). 
412  Id. 
413  Commission of Experts Resolution 780 Report, supra note 410, at ¶ 24.
414  Id. at ¶¶ 311-13.
415  See generally id.  
416  The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. 
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 The Security Council would replicate this approach to the 
situation in the former Yugoslavia in response to future situations. The 
Security Council first, upon taking note that violations were occurring, 
passed resolutions condemning the atrocities and determined that 
they constituted a threat to international peace and security. Seeing 
that this was insufficient, the Council set up a Commission of Experts 
to investigate and analyze the conflict and resultant violations. Finally, 
after receiving the Commission of Experts report confirming that such 
atrocities were occurring, the Security Council took further action and 
established an international judicial mechanism.417
C. Rwanda
 The subsequent establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) further solidified the norm of Security 
Council action under Chapter VII in response to grave violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights law. The creation of 
the ICTR took a similar route to that of the ICTY. After listening to 
Rwanda’s Permanent UN Representative’s plea for assistance, in March 
1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 812, the first resolution 
passed on Rwanda, on the basis of its “[g]rave concern [over] the 
fighting in Rwanda and its consequences for international peace and 
security.”418 In July 1994, the Security Council responded to continuing 
“reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of 
international humanitarian law . . . [had] been committed in Rwanda.”419 
In Resolution 935, it noted that “only a proper investigation can establish 
the facts in order to enable the determination of responsibility” and 
requested the Secretary-General to establish a Commission of Experts 
to provide “its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, 
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
417  In the former Yugoslavia, at least three of the factors identified in Threat to the 
Peace were present: (2) conflict among governmental bodies and insurgent armies or 
armed ethnic groups; (3) widespread internal humanitarian/human rights violations; 
(4) and, substantial outflow of refugees. See Threat to the peace, supra note 402, at 45; 
see also Commission of Experts Resolution 780 Report, supra note 410.
418  S.C. Res. 812, U.N. Doc. S/RES/812 (1993).
419  S.C. Res. 935, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (Jul. 1, 1994).
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including the evidence of possible acts of genocide.”420 In addition, the 
Commission examined “the question of the jurisdiction, international or 
national, before which such persons [those responsible for the crimes] 
should be brought to trial.”421  
 The Commission of Experts gathered information through 
field missions in Rwanda and neighboring countries as well as reports 
submitted by other UN bodies and outside organizations.422 The 
Commission found overwhelming evidence that Hutus had committed 
genocide against Tutsis.423 It also found significant evidence of crimes 
against humanity and other serious IHL violations, such as murder, 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, as well as the 
incitement of ethnically motivated hatred and violence, by individuals on 
both sides of the conflict.424 The Commission found that many of these 
violations were committed in a preplanned, systematic fashion.425 The 
Commission’s Preliminary Report of October 1994 recommended the 
establishment of a tribunal.426  
 Eighteen months after the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 827, establishing the ICTY, the Council adopted Resolution 
955 to establish the ICTR to prosecute those responsible for genocide and 
other serious IHL violations in Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible 
for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of 
neighboring states.427 The Security Council relied upon its Chapter VII 
powers after determining that the situation in Rwanda constituted a 
“threat to the peace.”428 
 Security Council action in Rwanda followed the pattern set 
by Security Council response to violations in the former Yugoslavia. 
420  Id. 
421  The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of the 
Commission of Experts pursuant to paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 935, 
U.N. Doc. S/1994/879, ¶ 10 (Oct. 4, 1994). 
422  Commission of Experts established in accordance with Security Council resolu-
tion 935, Preliminary report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in 
accordance with Security Council resolution 935, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125, 5-11 (Oct. 4, 
1994). 
423  Id. at ¶.148.
424  Id. at ¶¶ 146-47. 
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426  Id. at ¶ 150. 
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Upon acknowledging the gravity and severity of the violations that 
were occurring in Rwanda the Security Council passed resolutions 
condemning the atrocities, which also determined that they constituted 
a threat to international peace and security and called on the parties in 
the conflict to cease committing these violations. The Council then set 
up a Commission of Experts to investigate and confirm the existence of 
ongoing violations. Once the Commission’s Report was completed, which 
confirmed that such atrocities were occurring, the Security Council took 
further action and established another international judicial mechanism, 
the ICTR.429
D. Darfur
 The Rome Statute and the ICC came into effect on July 1, 2002, 
providing an additional international justice mechanism by which the 
UN Security Council could act. A case can proceed to the ICC through a 
UN Security Council referral to the ICC prosecutor,430 and the situation 
in Darfur became the first such referral in June 2005.431 
 In Resolution 1556 in July 2004, the Security Council condemned 
the violence in Darfur, specifically “all acts of violence and violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties to the 
crisis, in particular by the Janjaweed, including indiscriminate attacks 
on civilians, rapes, forced displacements, and acts of violence especially 
those with an ethnic dimension, and express[ed] its utmost concern at 
the consequences of the conflict in Darfur on the civilian population, 
including women, children, internally displaced persons, and refugees.”432 
The Council also noted the high outflow of refugees into neighboring 
Chad.433 The Security Council determined the situation in Sudan to be a 
threat to international peace and security and to stability in the region.434
429  In Rwanda, three of the five factors identified by Threat to the Peace were pres-
ent: (2) conflict among governmental bodies and insurgent armies or armed ethnic 
groups; (3) widespread internal humanitarian/human rights violations; and, (4) 
substantial outflow of refugees. See Threat to the peace, supra note 402, at 45.  
430  Rome Statute, supra note 106, at art. 13(b).
431  Press Release, United Nations Secretary-General, SG/SM/9797 AFR/1132 (Mar. 
31, 2005).
432  S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (Jul. 30, 2004).
433  Id. 
434  Id. 
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 With Resolution 1564 in September 2004, the Security Council 
created a Commission of Inquiry “to investigate reports of violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law . . . to determine 
. . . whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the 
perpetrators of such violations.”435 The Secretary-General appointed 
a team of five international legal and humanitarian rights experts as 
members of the commission, and the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights appointed a legal research team and an investigative 
team composed of investigators, forensic experts, military analysts, 
and investigators specializing in gender violence.436 The Commission 
conducted two missions to Sudan and visits to locations within 
neighboring Chad, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.437 In its report, the Commission 
noted that it “found that Government forces and militias conducted 
indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced 
disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur.”438 
Because these “acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic 
basis,” they “may amount to crimes against humanity.”439 The Commission 
noted that the “extensive destruction and displacement [had] resulted 
in a loss of livelihood and means of survival for countless women, men 
and children. In addition to the large scale attacks, many people have 
been arrested and detained, and many have been held incommunicado 
for prolonged periods and tortured.”440 The Commission noted that in 
particular instances of murder of civilians and pillage “may amount to 
war crimes.”441
 The Commission did not find sufficient evidence of “genocidal 
intent” on the part of the Sudanese government to conclude that the 
government had pursued a policy of genocide.442 However, in its report 
435  S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564, ¶ 12 (Sept. 18, 2004).
436  International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Com-
mission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (January 25, 2005) (herein-
after Darfur Report).
437  Id. at 13-14.
438  Id. at 3. 
439  Id. 
440  Id. 
441  Id. at 4. 
442  Id. 
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the Commission emphasized that the crimes for which it had found 
sufficient evidence “may be no less serious and heinous than genocide” 
and that the absence of a genocidal policy “should not be taken in any 
way as detracting from the gravity of the crimes perpetrated” in Darfur.443 
The Commission strongly recommended that the Security Council refer 
the situation in Darfur to the ICC.444 In light of this report, the Security 
Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC prosecutor via 
Resolution 1593, and he opened a formal investigation into Darfur on 
June 1, 2005.445 The ICC has issued three warrants of arrest subsequent to 
the referral, including one against the current President of the Republic of 
Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir.446
 As with the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Council first 
recognized that grave violations were occurring, passed resolutions 
condemning the violations and determined that they constituted a threat 
to international peace and security. It then created a Commission of 
Inquiry to investigate, and finally, it decided to pursue an international 
justice approach by referring the situation of Darfur to the ICC 
prosecutor.447 
E. Burma
 As noted in this report, the UN has repeatedly taken note 
of violations in Burma, especially in eastern Burma, since 1993. See 
generally Charts A, B, and C. In 1997, the ILO took further action after 
much criticism by the organization of Burma’s violations of the Forced 
Labour Convention. It established a Commission of Inquiry to look into 
violations of forced labor.448 The 1998 report of the Commission, which 
443  Id..
444  Id. at 5. 
445  S.C. Res. 1593 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (March 31, 2005). 
446  ICC-02/05-01/09 Case The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, War-
rant for Arrest issued by Pre-Ttrial Chamber I, ICC-02/05-01/09 (Mar. 4, 2009). 
The other two warrants of arrest issued by Pre-Trial I in relation to the Situation in 
Darfur are as follows: ICC-02/05-01/07 Case The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad 
Harun and Ali Muhammed Ali Abd-Al Rahman (May 2, 2007).
447  In Darfur, at least three of the factors identified in Threat to the Peace were pres-
ent: (2) conflict among governmental bodies and insurgent armies or armed ethnic 
groups; (3) widespread internal humanitarian/human rights violations; and, (4) 
substantial outflow of refugees. See Threat to the peace, supra note 402, at 45.
448  International Labour Organization, supra note 84, at Part I Establishment of the 
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was made up of three distinguished international jurists, concluded 
that “the obligation under Article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention to 
suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour is violated in Myanmar 
in national law, in particular by the Village Act and the Towns Act, as well 
as in actual practice in a widespread and systematic manner, with total 
disregard for the human dignity, safety and health and basic needs of the 
people of Myanmar.”449
 In addition to the ILO, various UN actors have continued to 
note further violations, including those that occurred during 2002 
and afterwards, and thus within the temporal jurisdiction of the Rome 
Statute. For example, General Assembly Resolution 60/232 of 2007 notes 
that the following crimes have been reported to occur in Burma: 
[D]iscrimination and violations suffered by persons 
belonging to ethnic nationalities of Myanmar, including 
extrajudicial killings, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence persistently carried out by members of the 
armed forces . . . the confiscation of arable land, crops, 
livestock and other possessions; and the prevailing 
culture of impunity.450 
 Additionally, the Myanmar Rapporteur’s reports on Burma 
consistently highlight the problem of forced displacement by the military, 
and have noted a deteriorating situation on this front in recent years.451 
His submissions also document reports of numerous cases of rape and 
sexual violence452 and multiple instances of extrajudicial killings and 
torture.453 The situation has also notably led to a significant outflow of 
refugees.454
 The recognition by actors within the UN system of the grave 
Commission, (1) Filing of the complaint, ¶ 1, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm#Part%20I
449  Id. at Part V Conclusions and Reccommendations, (3) Conclusions on the Sub-
stance of the Case, ¶ 536, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar5.htm#(5)%20Concluding%20observations.
450  G.A. Res. 61/232, supra note 182.
451  See supra Section III Human Rights Violations in Burma.
452  Id. 
453  Id. 
454  Id.
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situation in eastern Burma is welcome.455 Given the severity and long-
term nature of the violations in Burma, however, the UN Security 
Council should set up a Commission of Inquiry as it did in previous 
situations. The scale of the forced displacement—which includes the 
destruction or displacement of 3,077 villages according to the Myanmar 
Rapporteur as of 2006—justifies such an approach for example.456 
Comparably numbers are estimated to have been destroyed or damaged 
in Darfur.457 Despite its knowledge of such long-term systematic and 
widespread occurrence of violations such as these in Burma, the UN 
has failed to act through the Security Council in a similar manner to 
the situations discussed above. Following calls for action by the Security 
Council, it did, however, hold its first ever debate on Burma in December 
2005.458 In May 2006, the UN Security Council held a second briefing on 
Burma following a visit to the country by UN Under-Secretary-General 
for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari.459 The Security Council voted to 
include Burma on its agenda in September 2006.460 That same month, the 
UN Security Council held its first formal discussion on Burma. However, 
in January 2007, China and Russia vetoed a resolution requiring the 
restoration of democracy to Burma.461 
 Since then the Security Council has continued to watch 
the political situation in Burma, however. In October 2007 the 
455  These institutions, however, have limited institutional capacity to investigate 
violations. For example, the Special Rapporteur has limited resources and manpower 
that restricts his ability to investigate the situation in its entirety. One or two visits 
a year for a brief period cannot meet the needs to investigate the abuses that have 
persisted for a long number of years.
456  Special Rapporteur, supra note 188, at 54.
457  Darfur Report, supra note 436, at ¶ 236.
458  The Burma Campaign UK, Press Release, Havel & Tutu Praise Historic UNSC De-
bate (Dec. 16, 2005), at http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/burma/news/
Havel-Tutu-Praise-Historic-UNSC-Debate. 
459  The Burma Campaign UK, Press Release, Security Council Briefing Welcome, But 
Not Enough, (Jun. 01, 2006) at http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/burma/
news/Security-Council-Briefing-Welcome-But-Not-Enough.
460  Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council, In Procedural Ac-
tion, Votes To Include Human Rights Situation In Myanmar On Its Agenda, U/N. Doc. 
SC/8832 (Sept. 15, 2006).
461  Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt 
Draft Resolution on Myanmar Owing to Negative Votes  By China, Russian Federation, 
U.N. Doc. SC/8939 (Jan. 12, 2007) .
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Security Council issued a statement through its President Leslie Kojo 
Christian (Ghana), which deplored the violence used against peaceful 
demonstrators during the Saffron Revolution in Burma and emphasized 
the importance of the early release of all political prisoners and remaining 
detainees.462 The Security Council further acknowledged that it remained 
“seized of the matter.”463 It has also released press statements supporting 
the work of the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser to Myanmar, Ibrahim 
Gambari, focusing on the need for dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu 
Kyi, the fate of peaceful protestors, and the continuing detention of 
political prisoners.464 In May 2008, the Security Council noted Burma’s 
announcement on its national referendum on the draft constitution for 
the country.465 It further underlined the need for an inclusive process 
and participation of all political actors, and again noted that it remained 
“seized of the matter”.466
 Yet, while Burma remains on the permanent UN Security 
Council agenda, it has not recognized that the situation in Burma 
constitutes a “threat to the peace”. In the report Threat to the Peace the 
authors concluded that the situation in Burma displayed all of the main 
characteristics that had prompted such a determination and subsequent 
action elsewhere, inter alia (1) the overthrow of a democratically-elected 
government; (2) conflict among governmental bodies and insurgent 
armies or armed ethnic groups; (3) widespread internal humanitarian/
human rights violations; (4) substantial outflow of refugees; and (5) other 
cross-border problems (for instance, drug trafficking).467 With regards 
to Burma, this list includes factors that have resulted in spillover effects 
into other countries in the region, in particular external displacement 
462  Presidential Statement, United Nations Security Council, The Situation in Myan-
mar, U.N. Doc.  S/PRST/2007/37 (Oct. 11, 2007).
463  Id.
464  See Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Press State-
ment on Myanmar, U.N. Doc.  SC/9171 15 November, 2007 and Press Release, United 
Nations Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Myanmar, U.N. Doc. 
SC/9228 (Jan. 17, 2008).
465  Press Release, United Nations Security Council, Security Council Notes Myanmar’s 
announcement on May Referendum Elections in 2010; Underlines Need for Inclusive 
Process, Participation of all Actors, U.N. Doc. SC/9320 (May 2, 2008). 
466  Id.
467  Threat to the peace, supra note 402, see Executive Summary and at 50 et seq.
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from Burma to Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and Malaysia.468 Further, this 
reports establishment of the prima facie case of grave IHL and human 
rights violations should support a Security Council determination that 
the situation in Burma is a “threat to the peace”.
 Additionally, the establishment of the prima facie case of grave 
IHL and human rights violations in this report should form the basis for 
the Security Council creating a of creating a Commission of Inquiry. The 
Myanmar Rapporteur has described the violations that have taken place 
in Burma as “widespread and systematic”.469 The crimes noted by multiple 
UN organs to have taken place for more than a decade—killings, rape and 
other sexual violence, torture, and forced displacement—are all potential 
violations under the Rome Statute and justify further investigation.470 
 In conclusion, the comparison of the response of the Security 
Council to the previous three situations discussed above displays the need 
for it to move beyond mere discussion of the situation in Burma. The 
language used to describe the situation in Burma, such as “widespread” 
and “systematic” human rights and international humanitarian law 
violations echoes the language used to describe the situations in 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur. The Security Council adopted the same 
course of action in response to the grave violations occurring in each of 
these three situations. The Council first took note of serious violations 
and determined that they constituted a threat to international peace and 
security, then it created a Commission of Inquiry to investigate abuses 
further, and finally it took action in the form of creating an international 
tribunal or an ICC referral. The Security Council should initiate this 
process with respect to Burma.
468  Id. at 16 et seq.
469  Special Rapporteur, supra note 218, at ¶ 58.
470  Threat to the Peace notes that in Burma all of the factors that have in the past led 
to Security Council action under Chapter VII are present in eastern Burma: (1) the 
overthrow of a democratically-elected government; (2) conflict among governmental 
bodies and insurgent armies or armed ethnic groups; (3) widespread internal hu-
manitarian/human rights violations; (4) substantial outflow of refugees; and (5) other 
cross-border problems (for instance, drug trafficking). See Threat to the Peace, supra 
note 402, at 50. 
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Conclusion
 This report’s conclusion, reached by analyzing UN documents 
alone, is that there has been a long-term awareness on behalf of the UN 
of the grave human rights and humanitarian violations occurring in 
Burma. Since 1992, the UN has consistently condemned a wide-range of 
violations in the country. This awareness is underscored by this report’s 
in-depth study on eastern Burma since 2002 of forced displacement, 
sexual violence, extrajudicial killings, and torture. UN actors have 
described violations in this region as both “widespread” and “systematic,” 
as well as part of a “policy”. The Special Rapporteur whose mandate 
is to focus on the human rights situation in Burma has highlighted in 
particular the persistent nature of the violations and their “widespread 
and systematic” pattern. Moreover, he has come to the conclusion that 
these violations take place within a culture of impunity due to the military 
regime’s failure to provide accountability and justice. These concerns are 
echoed by other UN actors, such as the thematic Special Rapporteurs, 
when acting within their specific focus areas. 
 In short, UN actors documenting of reported violations have 
been strongly suggesting these violations may constitute crimes against 
humanity and war crimes under international criminal law. This creates 
a strong prima facie case that such crimes have been occurring, and 
justifies intensified UN Security Council action to investigate the scope 
and scale of these potential crimes. However, unlike the situations in the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur, the UN Security Council has 
not acted to thoroughly investigate the situation in Burma. This deficit 
cannot be filled by other organs within the UN system, and requires a 
Commission of Inquiry given the scale of the reported violations and 
their longstanding nature.
 If the international community and the UN Security Council 
fail to take action the evidence presented in this report suggests that the 
grave humanitarian situation in eastern Burma and elsewhere in the 
country will continue unchecked. The perpetrators of serious human 
rights and humanitarian violations will remain unaccountable. A culture 
of impunity will persist that is highly conducive to the continuance and 
escalation of violations. 
 To help prevent future violations, the UN Security Council 
should create a Commission of Inquiry mandated and sufficiently 
resourced to investigate adequately the situation and make appropriate 
recommendations based on its findings. This Commission should apply 
all relevant international criminal and humanitarian law standards, in 
order to analyze whether or not the ongoing widespread and systematic 
violations may amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes. The 
international community, particularly the member countries of the 
United Nations, should make it clear to the Security Council that such 
action is needed. Finally, the Security Council should be prepared to 
act upon findings and recommendations made by such a Commission, 
including a potential referral to the International Criminal Court, the 
permanent body established to investigate, try, and sentence those who 
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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1991 ai - - - - -
1992 aii aP*, 12* - aP aP aP, 8
1993 aiii aP*, 14* aP, 7 aP, 7 aP, 7 aP, 11
1994 aiv aP, 10 aP,10 aP, 10 aP, 10 aP, 4
1995 av a11, 16* a11 a11 a11 a5
1996 avi a11, 16* a11 a11 a11 a5
1997 avii a12, 20* a12 a12 a12 aP
1998 aviii a10, 17* a10 a10 a10 a5
1999 aix a13, 16* a14 a13 a13 a6
2000 ax a14*, 15 a16 a14 a14 a5
2001 axi a18, 19* a18 a20 a18 a7
2002 axii a3, 3* a3 a3 a3 a3
2003 axiii a3, 3* a3 a3 a3 a2
2004 axiv a3, 3* a3 a3 a3 a2
2005 axv a2, 2* a2 a2 a2 a2
2006 axvi a2, 3* a2 a2 a2 a2
2007 axvii a2, 4* x aP x aP
2008 axviii a2, 4* a2 x a2 a2
P: Preface of resolution (before the numbered paragraphs start). 
[#]: Paragraph number where the document mentions a certain crime 
by specific reference. Thus, if the resolution does not refer to the specific 
crime but refers to human rights or humanitarian violations in general, 
the table does not document this. The numbers provided are examples 
and are not necessarily documenting every instance a crime is mentioned. 
* For “displacement” The table provided examples of the document 
mentioning forced displacement and refugee flows to neighboring states. 




women,” but didn’t refer to sexual violence more specifically. In 1998, 
the resolutions begin to refer to sexual violence more specifically, listing 
violations, e.g. rape. 
•	 The	date	provided	for	the	Resolution	is	the	date	upon	which	
the General Assembly held the plenary meeting at which it adopted the 
resolution, this does not necessarily coincide with the date of general 
distribution.
Notes for Chart A:
 i  GA. Res. 46/132. U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/132 (Dec. 17, 1991). 
ii  GA. Res. 47/144 U.N. Doc A/RES/47/144 (Dec. 18, 1992). 
iii GA. Res. 48/150 U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/150 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
iv  GA. Res. 49/197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/197 (Dec. 23, 1994). 
v  GA. Res. 50/194 U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/194 (Dec. 22, 1995). 
vi  GA. Res. 51/117 U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/117 (Dec. 12, 1996). 
vii  GA. Res. 52/137 U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/137 (Dec. 12, 1997). 
viii GA. Res. 53/162 U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/162 (Dec. 9, 1998). 
ix  GA. Res. 54/186 U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/186 (Dec. 17, 1999). 
x  GA. Res. 55/112 U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/112 (Dec. 4, 2000). 
xi  GA. Res. 56/231 U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/231 (Dec. 24, 2001). 
xii GA. Res. 57/231 U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/231 (Dec.18, 2002). 
xiii GA. Res. 58/247 U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/247 (Dec. 23, 2003). 
xiv  GA. Res. 59/263 U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/263 (Dec. 23, 2004). 
xv  GA. Res. 60/233 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/233 (Dec. 23, 2005). 
xvi  GA. Res. 61/232 U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/232 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
xvii  GA. Res. 62/222 U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/222 (Dec. 22, 2007). 
xviii GA. Res. 63/245 U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/245 (Dec. 24, 2008). 
Chart B: Human Rights Violations Listed by Commission on Human Rights 










1992 ai a9* - - - a2
1993 aii aP*, 13* aP, 6 aP, 6 aP, 6 aP, 9
1994 aiii a7, 16* a7 a7 a7 a10
1995 aiv aP*,11 a11 a11 a11 a4
1996 av a10, 17* a10 a10 a10 a10
1997 avi a2, 2* a2 a2 a2 a2
1998 avii a3, 3* a3 a3 a3 a3
1999 aviii a4, 4* a4 a4 a4 a4
2000 aix a6, 6* a6 a6 a6 a5
2001 ax a4, 4* a4 a4 a4 a4
2002 axi a5, 5* a5 a5 a5 a5
2003 axii a3, 3* a3 a3 a3 a3
2004 axiii a3, 3* a3 a3 a3 a3
2005 axiv a3, 3* a3 a3 a3 a3
2006 x x x x x x
2007 axv x x a1 x a1
2008 axvi a6 x x a6 a6
P: Preface of resolution (before the numbered paragraphs start). 
[#]: Paragraph number where the document mentions a certain crime 
by specific reference. Thus, if the resolution does not refer to the specific 
crime but refers to human rights or humanitarian violations in general, 
the table does not document this. The numbers provided are examples 
and are not necessarily documenting every instance a crime is mentioned. 
* For “displacement” The table provided examples of the document 
mentioning forced displacement and refugee flows to neighboring states. 
Those marked with an asterisk are refugee flows. 




women,” but didn’t refer to sexual violence more specifically. In 2000 the 
resolutions begin to refer to rape and other forms of sexual violence.  
Notes for Chart B:
i  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 1992/58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1992/58 (Mar. 3, 
1992). 
ii  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 1993/73, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1993/73 (Mar. 10, 
1993). 
iii  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 1994/85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1994/85 (Mar. 9, 
1994). 
iv  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 1995/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1995/72 (Mar. 8, 
1995). 
v  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 1996/80, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1996/80 (Apr. 23, 
1996). 
vi  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 1997/64, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/64 (Apr. 16, 
1997). 
vii  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 1998/63, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1998/63 (Apr. 21, 
1998). 
viii  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 1999/17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/17 (Apr. 23, 
1999). 
ix   Comm’n on H.R. Res. 2000/23, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/23 (Apr. 18, 
2000). 
x  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 2001/15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/15 (Apr. 18, 
2001). 
xi  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 2002/67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/67 (Apr. 25, 
2002). 
xii  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 2003/12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/12 (Apr. 16, 
2003). 
xiii  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 2004/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/61 (Apr. 21, 
2004). 
xiv  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 2005/10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/10 (Apr. 14, 
2005). 
xv  Comm’n on H.R. Res. S-5/1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-5/1 (Oct. 2, 2007). 
xvi  Comm’n on H.R. Res. 8-14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/14 (Jun. 18, 2008). 
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Chart C: Human Rights Violations Listed by Reports of the Special 










1993 ai a76, 133* a77-8 a71-5 a97-100 a117-
199 Burma
1994 aii a10* 49, 55 a49, 55 a53-5 a48 a68 Burma/
Thailand








1997 av a72-79 a22, 85 a20 a22 a105 No Access/
Thai
1998 avi a74 a65-66 a24-27 a49-52 a28-48 No Access
1999 avii a27-34 a67 a60 a21, 37 a60 No Access/
Thai
2000 aviii a38 a50-2, 56 a15-16 a63 a8, 58 None
2001
(a)**




ax a98, 98*, 
99*100
a17 - - a43
Burma
2002 axi - a10 a11 a26 a11, 26 Burma
2003 axii a46-9 a58-9 a44, 57 a56 a56 Thailand
2004 axiii a44 - a44 a40 a24 Burma/
Thailand
2005 axiv a82-85 a65, 72 a68 a46, 51-3 a94 No Access
2006 axv a44-5 a30 a46-47 a46 a34 NoAccess/
Ind/Mal/
Thai/Ind
2007 axvi a56 a41 a56 a37 a49 NoAccess/
Ind/Mal/
Thai/Ind
2008 axviii a69, 71* a58, 78, 87 a58, 80 a58 a43 Burma/
Thailand
P: Preface of document (before the numbered paragraphs start). 
[#]: Paragraph number where document mentions certain crime. 
Examples are included rather than every instance. 
-Dates given are the dates the reports came out. So the “visit” section 
refers to whether there was a visit allowed in the making of the report, 
rather than whether there was a visit allowed that year. E.g. although 
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there was no visit allowed in 2004, rather in 2003, the 2004 report was 
based on a 2003 visit. 
* For “displacement” I counted both refugee flows and internal 
displacement. Those marked with an asterisk are refugee flows. 
** The rows 2001(a) and (b) are to be read together as 2001(a) was an 
interim report about a fact-finding mission the Special Rapportuer 
undertool in 2001. The report in 2001(b) was the full report later 
submitted about the fact-finding mission. . 
 
NB: 
The table does not document every report issued by the Special 
Rapporteur during this period. In the years where the Special Rapporteur 
issued more than one report only one is included as an illustrative 
example.
Notes for Chart C:
i  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any 
Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights,, in accordance 
with Commission resolution 1992/58, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/37  (Feb. 17, 
1993). 
ii  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any 
Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, in accordance 
with Commission resolution 1993/73, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/57, (Feb. 16, 
1994). 
iii  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any 
Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights,, in accordance 
with Commission resolution 1994/85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65, (Jan. 12, 
1995). 
iv   The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any 
Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, in accordance 
with Commission resolution 1995/72, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/65, (Feb. 5, 
1996). 
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Notes for Chart C, cont’d: 
v  The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on 
the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Interim report of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human 
rights in Myanmar, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 
51/117 and Economic and Social Council decision 1997/272, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1997/64 (Feb. 6, 1997). 
vi  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 
Any Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the 
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, submitted 
in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/64, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/70, (Jan. 15, 1998). 
vii  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 
Any Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the 
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, submitted 
in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/63, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1999/35, (Jan. 22, 1999). 
viii  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 
Any Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the 
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, submitted 
in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/17, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/2000/38 (Jan. 24, 2000). 
ix  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/56/312 (Aug. 20, 2001). 
x  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any 
Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights,, in accordance 
with Commission resolution 2001/15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/45 (Jan. 10, 
2002). 
xi  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any 
Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, in accordance 
with Commission resolution 2002/67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/41 (Dec. 27, 
2002). 
Notes for Chart C, cont’d: 
xii  The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on 
the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Interim report of the Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human 
rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/58/219, 
(Aug. 5, 2003).
xiii  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any 
Part of the World: Situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2004/33 (Jan. 5, 2004). 
xiv  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human 
Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General 
Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/221, ¶ 83 (Aug. 12, 2005).
xv  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/369, (Sept. 21, 2006).
xvi  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, 
Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 
Entitled “Human Rights Council”: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/4/14, (Feb. 12, 2007).
xvii  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human right in Myanmar, 
Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention: Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, delivered to 
the General Assembly, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/18, (Mar. 
7, 2008). 
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Chart D: Human Rights Abuses Committed by Burma’s Military Regime,
Already Documented by the United Nations and Prohibited by the Rome 
Statutei
A) Human rights abuses listed Under Article 7, “Crimes Against Humanity”
a Murder 
a Enslavement       
a Deportation or forcible transfer of population    
a Torture
a Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law
a Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity
a Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, 
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other 
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international 
law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court;
a Enforced disappearance of persons
a Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
B) Human rights abuses listed Under Article 8, Section 2 (c) and (e), “War 
Crimes”ii 
a  Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture;
a  Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment;
a  Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or 
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against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
a Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, 
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and 
places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military 
objectives;
a Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed 
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;
a  Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to 
the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military 
reasons so demand;
a Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict
Notes for Chart D:
 i  While this report focuses in particular on forced displacement, sexual vio-
lence, extrajudicial killings, and torture, the United Nations has documented 
each of the above mentioned human rights abuses. For each abuse, the ele-
ments of the crime and jurisdictional requirements must be met in order to 
qualify as a “crime”. The Commission of Inquiry should investigate all of these 
abuses.
ii  Abuses listed in this section of the Rome Statute address “armed conflict 
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